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INTRODUCTION.
The first amendment to the United States Constitution secures religious
liberty, commanding that "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.

The

proper scope of the first provision, the establishment clause, is disputed,2
but it generally prevents government from discriminating on the basis of
religion, financially supporting religion, or requiring adherence to an
official religion.

At the center of public debate over such issues as school

1U.S. Const. amend. I.

The first amendment applies as a restriction
against actions only of the federal government, see Permoli v. First Munici
pality of New Orleans, 44 U.S (3 How.) 589 (1845) and Barron v. Mayor of
Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 254 (1833). However, through a series of Supreme
Court rulings culminating in the 1940's, the due process clause of the four
teenth amendment ("No state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law . . . . " U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1,
cl. 3) gradually "absorbed" the first amendment into its meaning, so the
fourteenth amendment restricts state actions in precisely the same way the
first amendment restricts those of the federal government. See Everson v.
Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (upholding local school board's reim
bursement of parents for costs of transporting children to public, private,
and parochial schools via public transportation system), Cantwell v. Connecti
cut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (striking down licensing requirement for door-to-door
solicitation). Hamilton v. Regents of the University of California, 293 U.S.
245 (1934). Pierce v. Society of Sisters. 268 U.S. 510 (1925), and Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 10 (1905)
2Compare. e.g., Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), Engle
v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (striking down nominally voluntary recitation
of state-written prayer in public schools), School District v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203 (1963) (striking down nominally voluntary Bible readings and recita
tion of Lord's Prayer in public schools), and Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602
(1971) (striking down public salary supplements of teachers in parochial
schools) with Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-699 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) and Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
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prayer 3 and educational voucher systems,4 the establishment clause
bly the higher-profile of the two provisions.

1S

proba

But the second one, the free

exercise clause, is an important protector of religious liberty in its own
right, "[f]or despite a general harmony between the two religious clauses

... "

the Free Exercise Clause no doubt has a reach of its own." S While the

proper interpretation of this clause too is debated,6 it generally prevents
government from interfering with an individual's preferred form of worship.
In highly simplified terms, the establishment clause prohibits government from
forcing adherence to a particular religion, and the free exercise clause
prevents government from obstructing adherence to a freely chosen religion.
Two general schools of thought have developed
proper interpretation of the free exercise clause.
agreed on two points:
I

oPPosin~s

By

of the

1940~ everyone

to meet the requirement of the free exercise clause,

lation had to have a secular purpose and had to be generally applica

3See , e.g., School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)
4See , e.g., Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973) (striking down state policy providing tax deductions to parents who
send their children to parochial schools)
5Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461 (1971)
6Compare, e.g., Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586,
601 (1940) (Stone, J., dissenting) (upholding mandatory flag salute in public
schools against free exercise challenge by Jehovah's Witnesses), Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599,610 (1961) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (upholding applica
tion of Sunday Closing Law to orthodox Jewish merchant), Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963) (overturning denial of unemployment compensation to
Seventh-Day Adventist terminated because of refusal to work on Saturdays),
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1971) (exempting Amish from compliance with
compulsory secondary education law), and Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res.
v. Smith, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 1606 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring in result)
(upholding denial of unemployment benefits to Native American terminated for
sacramental use of peyote) with Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 586, Braunfeld, 366 U.S.
at 599, Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707, 720 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (striking down denial of unemployment benefits to Jehovah's
Witness who quit his job when transferred to department producing tank
turrets), and Smith, 110 S.Ct. at 1595.
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In other words, legislation violated the free exercise clause if its

purpose was the suppression or regulation of religious practices or if it
discriminated on the basis of religion.
that did not meet these standards.

Courts would strike down legislation

The primary disagreement in the free

exercise field has centered around cases in which a religious adherent
challenges a secular, general law that meets these standards yet still
interferes with his ability to practice his religion. 8
Some judges and legal scholars believe that the free exercise clause
often requires courts to exempt religious objectors from compliance with
general laws that interfere with their religious practices. 9

Justice Brennan

described this pro-exemptions view as "nothing more than the governmental

7See , e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) and Minersville
School District v. Gobitis, 3109 U.S. 586 (1940)
8See , e.g., Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 110 S.Ct.
1595 (1990), Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 490(1981), Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972), Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961), Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S.
586 (1940)
9Infringements of free exercise can take two forms. Legislation may
interfere with religious beliefs or with religious conduct, including both
religiously motivated actions and abstinences. Since the Court's first
significant free exercise case, it has consistently held that the Constitution
protects religious belief absolutely but provides only qualified protection
for religiously motivated conduct. For instance, Justice Roberts once wrote
that "the [first a]mendment embraces two concepts,--freedom to believe and
freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the
second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of
society." Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) (footnote
omitted). In general, governmental interference with religious beliefs is
never justified and is unconstitutional. See also Emplo.vment Div., Dep't of
Human Res. v. Smith, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 1599 (1990), Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398, 402-03 (1963), and Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879)
("Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was
left free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or
subversive of good order."). Consequently, the debate over free exercise
exemptions concerns only instances when legislation interferes with religious
ly motivated conduct. Issues surrounding free exercise protection of reli
gious beliefs are beyond the scope of this paper.
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obligation of neutrality in the face of religious differences . . . . tt10

For

at least some of the advocates of this position, the pro-exemptions view is
based on an assumption that the democratic process is structurally tilted in
favor of mainstream religious sects. 11

Democratic governments, according to

this outlook, will not normally pass a law interfering with mainline religious
practices, but they may unknowingly enact legislation that obstructs the
exercise of minority faiths.
social security numbers in its Food Stamp program, i

vided for the use
id not realize

that using a unique identifier would interfere with
of some Native Americans for whom a number would be used. 12

Legislative

bodies do not commission religious-impact statements for every bill they pass.
Under a pro-exemptions view, the free exercise clause would often correct
these oversights by excusing religious objectors from compliance with laws
interfering with their unconventional religious practices. 13

Of course, the

clause would also secure free exercise of religion when an insensitive or even
oppressive legislature enacted a secular, general law fully aware that its
provisions would obstruct the religious practices of some sects.

The center

piece of this interpretation of the free exercise clause is a constitutional

10Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)
11See S.D. Smith, The Restoration of Tolerance, 78 Calif. L. Rev. 305
(1990)

12See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (upholding against free exercise
challenge use of social security number in certain governmental programs)
13Not even Justices Brennan or Marshall, however, would have exempted
Native Americans from laws requiring government to use social security
numbers. Id.
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right to exemption from religiously burdensome laws regardless of the motives
of the legislative body which enacted them. 14
Other judges and legal scholars, however, argue that government fulfills
its "obligation of neutrality" merely by enacting generally applicable,
secular laws. 15

They condemn exemptions as special treatment for minority

religious sects, rather than "neutrality.,,16

They also believe that the

broad religious diversity of the United States makes any system of religious
exemptions unmanageable. 17

Religious minorities could use the democratic

process to gain statutory exemptions:

These judges and scholars would respect

any legislatively enacted system of exemptions.

They simply do not believe

that cutting exceptions from general laws is a proper role for the judicia
ry.18
The U.S. Supreme Court has considered the issue of exemptions from the
time of its first significant free exercise case in 1879. 19

Though initial

ly critical of the pro-exemptions view, the Court gradually adopted it.

In

1940, the Court's free exercise doctrine began evolving toward an eventual

14 See , e.g., Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981), Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1971), and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)
15Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 110 S.Ct. 1595 (1990),
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (Burger, C.J., plurality opinion), Thomas v.
Review Board, 450 U.S. 707,720 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), and P.
Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U.Chi.L.Rev. 1 (1961)
16See , e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 422 (1963) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)
17 See , e.g, Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 110 S.Ct.
1595, 1605 (1990)
18 See , e.g., West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 651 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
19Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (upholding federal anti
polygamy statute against Mormon's free exercise challenge)

fntroduction.
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constitutional right to religious exemptions,20 and in 1963,

the Court granted its first free exercise exemption. 21

By 1981, the Court

had solidified the pro-exemptions approach, known as strict scrutiny, in the
free exercise field. 22
However, problems with the doctrine had been apparent since at least
1963, and they became increasingly obvious during the 1980's.

Partly as a

result of these problems and partly because of ideological shifts among the
justices, the Court came full circle in Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res.

v. Smith (Smith II) (1990) and abandoned both strict scrutiny and the proexemptions position in the free exercise field. 23
In Smith II, two Native Americans challenged, as a violation of free
exercise, Oregon's denial of their request for unemployment compensation.
Their employer, a private drug rehabilitation organization, had fired them
when it learned of their sacramental use of the illega1 24 drug peyote.
Oregon denied their request for unemployment compensation, deeming their
peyote use "misconduct."

The Oregon Supreme Court eventually ruled that the

free exercise clause demanded that sacramental use of peyote had to be
exempted from the "misconduct" provision of the compensation regulations.

But

Oregon appealed, and in 1990, the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately upheld the
state's denial of benefits.

20Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 u.S. 586 and Minersville School District
v. Gobitis, 3109 U.S. 586
21Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
22Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707
23Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 110 S.Ct. 1595
24Several western states, no doubt respectful of the religious practices
of their Native American residents, had provided statutory exemptions from
their drug laws for the sacramental use of peyote. See Smith II, 110 S.Ct. at
1606
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Smith II was notable not so much because of its result but because it
radically altered the method of adjudicating most free exercise claims.

In

short, it virtually eliminated constitutionally compelled religious exemptions
and repudiated free exercise strict scrutiny.

It represented one of those

remarkable moments in constitutional history when a Supreme Court minority!s
position, developed in previous opinions, overtakes a former majority's views
and becomes the new rule of constitutional law.

While not directly overruling

any precedents, the decision in Smith II so narrowed and reinterpreted
previous rulings that the new doctrine it established virtually supplanted the
pro-exemptions position embodied in the strict scrutiny approach.
This paper focuses on the erosion of strict scrutiny in the 1980's and
attempts to explain how it happened.

It is divided into five sections.

Section one presents a detailed definition of strict scrutiny and explains
some of its problems.

Section two examines the background which led to the

eventual establishment of strict scrutiny in the free exercise field in 1963.
Section three explains how strict scrutiny was firmly installed as a free
exercise doctrine in several cases from 1963 to 1981.

Section four analyzes

the erosion of free exercise strict scrutiny during the 1980's.
five illustrates its practical elimination in 1990.

And Section

Finally, the paper con

cludes with some notes about the state of the free exercise clause after 1990.
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§ 1.

FREE EXERCISE STRICT SCRUTINY AND ITS PROBLEMS.
By requiring the courts to grant religious exemptions, strict scrutiny

theoretically provided a very high level of protection for religious minori
ties.

But the doctrine's comprehensive nature created serious problems that

rendered the Supreme Court a less-than-zealous protector of religious liberty.
In fact, after introducing strict scrutiny into the free exercise field in
1963, the Court declined to exempt religious objectors in many of the cases in
which it heard free exercise challenges to general legislation. 2S

This less

than powerful record of judicial review suggests that the members of the
Court, even those who most ardently supported free exercise strict scrutiny,
had difficulties with the doctrine.
Several characteristics defined the doctrine of strict scrutiny in the
free exercise field.

When the Court formulated the approach in 1963, it was

consolidating several judicial standards that had appeared separately in
previous free exercise cases.

In those cases the Court had begun to require

government to meet two distinct criteria in order to justify an infringement
of free exercise rights.

In addition to the secular-purpose and general-

applicability standards mentioned previously, the Court sometimes required
that legislation be "narrowly drawn,,26 to achieve its goal while minimizing

2S See , e.g, Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986), United States v. Lee, 455
U.S. 252 (1982). and Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971)
26 E. g ., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 116 (1943)

§ 1.

Free Exercise Strict Scrutiny and Its Problems.

any interference with religious practices.

9

This rule later became known

A.S

the requirement of "least restrictiv?~t'27 because it required govern

ment to design its policies so that ~.~Jsed the legislative means ~'hich were
least restrictive of religious exercise yet still able to fulfill the legisla
tive end sought.

In other cases the Court mentioned a fourth criterion.

All

interference with religious practices would be unconstitutional unless
permitting the practices would substantially undermine government's ability to
achieve some secular goal that it was seeking to fulfill. 28

Allowing the

religious practice would have to do more than merely inconvenience government.
Sometimes the Court stated a variation of this criterion, asserting that the
secular goal itself had to be very important if the Court were to permit an
interference with religious exercise. 29

Either formulation would require

government to show an important reason for interfering with religious practic
es, a reason that the Court eventually labelled a "compelling state inter
est.,,30
It was not until the 1960's and 1970's, however, that the Court applied
both the least-restrictive-means and compelling-interest standards in the same
free exercise case.

Only in Sherbert v. Verner (1963)31 did the two crite

ria begin to coalesce into free exercise strict scrutiny, a comprehensive
method for analyzing the constitutional challenges of religious objectors.
Strict scrutiny had developed at an earlier date in other constitutional

27 E. g ., Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981)
28 See, e.g., West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 639 (1943)

29 See , e.g., Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 595
(1940 )

30Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 613 (1961) (Brennan. J .• dissenting)
31 374 U. S . 398

§ 1.
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V)

fields, such as equal protection,J- but the Court did not begin using it to
grant free exercise exemptions from general laws until 1963. 33

In fusing

the least-restrictive-means and compelling-interest standards, strict scrutiny
demanded more of legislation than merely a secular purpose and general
applicability.

Under strict scrutiny the burden of proof shifted to govern

ment,34 which had to prove the constitutionality of legislation that inter
fered with religious practices.

According to Chief Justice Burger, !'[t]he

state may justify an inroad on religious liberty by showing that it is the
least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state interest.,,35
But the actual process of judicial decision-making under strict scrutiny
was a bit more complex than his statement suggested.

When the Court heard a

case in which a religious adherent challenged a piece of legislation as
burdening his free exercise of religion, the Court had to first determine if
the legislation actually interfered with the challenger's practice of some
tenet of faith.

If the Court found that the legislation did in fact burden

3»

-See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.

21t~

(1944)

33Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
34In ordinary constitutional review the Court requires the challenger to
prove that government has violated the Constitution. Under this rational
basis standard, the challenger has to show that the end sought by some piece
of legislation is not constitutionally within the power of the enacting
legislative body. Alternately, the challenger might demonstrate that the
means which government adopted to meet its legislative goal bear no rational
relationship to the achievement of that goal. This standard, very deferential
to the decisions of legislative bodies, can be traced back at least to the
Marshall Court. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,421 (1819)
("Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution,
and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end,
which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the
constitution, are constitutional."), United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch.) 358, 396 (1805) ("Congress must possess the choice of means, and must
be empowered to use any means which are in fact conducive to the exercise of a
power granted by the constitution."), and L. Tribe, American Constitutional
Law, § 5-3, 300-05 (1987)

35Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981)

§ 1.
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then adopt a \·'orklog

assumption that exempting the religious objector fr8m the challenged legisla
tion would constitute an acceptable. least-restrictive means to
le .p.l·slatl've gnal.36

se~ure

the

T0 preven.t tl Ie r
t f_rom granlng
t'
.
~our
a f ree exerCIse

exemption, government had to dRmonstrate that there was some lmportant reason.
qualifying as a compelling state interest, for denying the exemption and
Dermitting government to interfere with the religious practices.

Justice

Brennan explained this compelling-interest requirement in 1963, when the Court
first applied strict scrutiny in the free exercise field.

To justify the

r--'''-.

infringement of free exercise

~ShOWing

merely of a rational relationship to

some colorable state interest would suffice. ,,37

Instead, '" [o]nly the

gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible
limitation!" of the free exercise of religion. 38

In other words, government

had to show not only that the goal of its challenged legislative provision was
"paramount" but also that permitting the religious practices which the
provision infringed would pose some "grave" threat to government's ability to
achieve its goal.

Even if government could meet this test and justify some

interference with the objector's religious practices, it would still have to
show that it had chosen the legislative means which, next to a complete
religious exemption, were the least restrictive of religious exercise and
still achieved the legislative goal. 39

Strict scrutiny in the free exercise

36Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 608 (1961) (considering religious
exemption as a less restrictive means)
37Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963)
38 Id . (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 [1945])
39 Id . at 407
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least-restrictive-mean~

and

compelling-interest standards.
At least on paper, strict scrutiny looked like a powerfuliudicial
doctrine.

But its inherent power was troublesome for the Court.

Strict

scrutiny sometimes led the Court to overstate the negative potential of
religious exemptions to avoid granting them in particular cases. 40

These

loose applications of the doctrine threatened to undermine strict scrutiny
itself by setting a practical standard that was less rigorous than the
theoretical rules embodied in the doctrine.

The reasons for these loose

applications seemed grounded in four major problems with strict scrutiny in
the free exercise field.
First, religious exemptions, like those constitutionally mandated under
strict scrutiny, might contravene the establishment clause.

The Court had

also interpreted the establishment clause broadly, so that the government had
to have a secular purpose for all its legislation and had to remain religious
ly neutral, never favoring religion over non-reI

ion. 41

This establishment

clause interpretation might seem to harmonize quite well with the free
exercise clause since both doctrines would require the government to demon
strate a secular purpose and non-discrimination.

However, the addition to

free exercise jurisprudence of an exemption doctrine created a possibility
that the religion clauses might sometimes contradict one another.

For

instance, some justices suggested that free exercise exemptions which the
Court could order under strict scrutiny, would violate the establishment

40 See , e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982)
41 See , e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), School District v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), and Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1
(1947)

§
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The justices noted

that the legislative body might have difficulty demonstrating a secular
,justification for the exemptions.

The legislative exemptions might also

either favor the exempted religion over other religions or favor religion Ln
general over non-religion.

Consequently, the Court would have to strike down

on establishment grounds legislative exemptions similar to those the Court
might mandate on free exercise grounds. 43
Second, the Court reviewed several cases in which it could not honestly
find a compelling state interest but also recognized that religious exemptions
would be undesirable.

Requiring a compelling interest seemed fine in theory,

but in some of the Court's cases an exemption might have created serious
administrative problems or might have significantly have limited governmental
discretion over its own operations. 44

But administrative convenience had

generally not been deemed sufficiently compelling to justify infringements of
liberty.
Third, not inconsistent with the warnings of some anti-exemption judges
and legal scholars, the broad religious diversity within the United States did

42 See , e.g, Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707, 725 and 726 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J. t dissenting) and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 414-417
(1963) (Stewart, J., concurring)
43Establishment and free exercise doctrines, both taken to their logical
extremes (and there was no theoretical reason not to do so), would create
complete rigidity in the first amendment. The only constitutionally valid
religious exemptions would be those which the free exercise clause required.
Legislative bodies would be powerless to accommodate religious exercise beyond
the mandates of the free exercise clause. This could lead to unacceptable
results. For instance, if the free exercise clause did not require military
draft exemptions (because of an obviously compelling interest). the establish
ment clause (it doctrines taken to the logical extreme) might preclude
Congress from legislatively enacting them.

44 See , e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485
U.S. 660 (1988) (upholding forest service administrative decision to build
road through portion of national forest deemed sacred by Native Americans) and
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986)
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Probl~ms.
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in
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cases, the Court did not simplY consider whether or nl)t the religious adher
cnts at .issue should rece!\'e an exemption.

rnstead, the Court ccmtempJa:ed

the domino effect that might result tram grantJng an exemptlon
of the sect befoft>. them. 45

fO

the members

When the Court feared a flood of similar f'lalmS,

it was reluctant to grant the exemption in the case at hand.
Moreover, the Court also feared that some of the claims in this poten
tial flood of litigation would be fraudulent. 46

~

...

A great deal of subjective

judging in the religion field rendered strict scrutiny susceptible to abuse .
People might seek to dodge compliance with laws they merely disliked by
alleging infringements of bogus religions whose tenets happened to correspond
to the provisions of the laws that the "religious adherents" disliked.
Because the Court had no set constitutional definition for "religion," it
referred to some very general standards in making basically ad hoc, case-bv

case decisions as to whether a claimant's alleged non-traditional religion
merited constitutional protection.

The Court also had ruled that it would not

determine the truth or falsity of an individual's professed religion, onlv the
sincerity with which the adherent held his religious beliefs. 47

These t~o

inherent limitations on the Court's judicial power in the religion field
created a real danger that strict scrutiny might require the Court to exempt
from governmental policies individuals whose fraudulent claims the Court might
be unable to reject.

45 See , e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) and Gillette v.
United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971)
46 See , e.g., Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) and Gillette v. United
States, 401 u.S. 437 (1971)
47See [mited States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944)
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it reViev.led after adopting the doctrine in

of these potential difficuJ ties, it exer<;ised

caution, and, consequently,

j

i~reat

ts free exercise tracK record was l:ot aSlnti.

goverrmlent under strict scrutiny as a mere reading at the doctrine's criteria
,/~

might suggest that it would be.

But "hile doctrinal difficulties m i g G u s t i f Y an aL teration of

strict scrutiny, they are inadequate to explain the wholesale abandonment of
the doctrine in 1990.

In fact, they probably were not even the most signifi

cant reason for the eventual demise of strict scrutiny.
changes among the Court's members.

More telling were the

At the same time the Court was cautiously

recognizing problems with strict scrutiny, it was becoming more conservative
and less supportive of an activist defense of religious liberty.

The composi

tion of the Court obviously changed between Sherbert in 1963 and Smith I~8
in 1990, and several key replacements helped to alter its mood toward free
exercise protection. 49

More importantly, conversions of several justices

from a pro-exemptions to an anti-exemptions position were also critical to the
death of free exercise strict scrutiny.50
The combination of these factors led to the radical shift in Smith II.
Throughout the 1980's, opposition to free exercise strict scrutiny grew as its
flaws became increasingly apparent and the Court grew more conservative.

48 110 S.Ct. 1595
49For instance, Reagan's replacement of Chief Justice Burger with Chief
Justice Rehnquist in 1986, providing an open slot for the appointment of
Justice Scalia, resulted in a net loss of a free exercise moderate and a net
gain of a no-exemptions vote.
50Several justices, including Justices Rehnquist and Stevens, though
once endorsing free exercise strict scrutiny, converted to a no-exemptions
position.
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and the strict scrutiny doctri:w c[;.d,ed tmder preSSllre l-hich
a decade.

mounted for

Justice ScaLia, l.v"riting fnr a fLve-man majority in Smith II,

announced that the Court wouid no longer apply strict scrutiny
:mv

ha;.t

orit\,

ill

virtuallv

free e\erc i se case.:;.
But the new majority did not attempt to fashion a new doctrine which

would correct some of the problems of the old one yet still provide signifi
cant free exercise protection.

Scalia simply deleted the least-restrictive

means and compelling-interest requirements and virtually abandoned the policy
of exempting religious objectors.

Stripped of these standards, free exercise

jurisprudence retained only the secular-purpose and general-applicability
rules.

As a result, the Court would uphold governmental interferences with

religious practices unless the legislation was not generally applicable or its
purpose was not secular.

Since governmental bodies, at least in recent

history, had almost never practiced this type of blatant religious discrimi
nation, the practical effect of Smith II was the elimination of free exercise
as a meaningful right.

The new test so restricted the scope of the free

exercise clause that were it deleted from the Constitution

entirely~

what

little meaning it retained after Smith II would arguably be covered by other
constitutional provisions. 51

Free exercise retained virtually no indepen

dent meaning.

51Justice O'Connor warned in 1986 that the establishment of such a
limited free exercise approach would "relegate[] a serious First Amendment
value to the barest level of minimal scrutiny that the Equal Protection Clause
[of the fourteenth amendment] already provides." Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693,
727 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting). In fact, to guard
against non-secular legislative purposes and to protect religious beliefs as
well as conduct, the Court would probably have to rely on the establishment
clause and the freedoms of speech and press in addition to the equal protec
tion clause.
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§ 2.

THE ORIGINS OF FREE EXERCISE STRICT SCRUTINY.
When the Court introduced strict scrutiny into free exercise jurispru

dence in Sherbert (1963), it was not dealing with a new concept.

Justice

Stone had explained the philosophical justifications for such a protective
standard as early as 1938,52 and the Court had adopted the doctrine in equal
protection jurisprudence nearly twenty years before Sherbert. 53

Dissenting

justices in free exercise cases prior to 1963 had urged the Court to apply
this approach in the field of religious liberty,54 and from the earliest
free exercise cases the Court had faced the question of religious exemp
tions. 55

Thus, the Sherbert Court was not working in a constitutional

vacuum.
In the Court's first significant free exercise decision it soundly
rejected any notion that the free exercise clause mandated religious exemp
tions from otherwise valid laws.

In Reynolds v. United States (1879),56 the

Court held that a federal law prohibiting polygamy in the territories did not
violate the free exercise rights of Mormons.

Writing for a unanimous Court,

52See United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152, n. 4
53 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)
54 See , e.g, Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 603
(1940) (Stone, J., dissenting)
55 See , e.g, Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879)
56 98 u. S. 145
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Chief Justice Waite determined that polygamy vas not a protected form of
religious conduct and condemned the idea of mandatory exemptions. 57

The

Court reaffirmed this categorical opposition to religious exemptions eleven
years later in Davis v. Beason. 58

In fact, the unanimous Court rejection of

religious exemptions continued well into the New Deal era.

As late as 1934,

for instance, Justice Cardozo warned of the potential dangers resulting from
religious exemptions, noting that tt[tJhe right of private judgment has never
yet been so exalted above the powers and the compulsion of the agencies of
government. ,,59
Then came the judicial revolution of 1937, emphasizing the necessity for
the Court to presume the validity of governmental policies, particularly New
Deal economic regulations, until proven unconstitutional.

However, in United

States v. Carolene Products (1938),60 Justice Stone remarked in passing in
his famous footnote number four of the potential need for an exception to this
policy of judicial restraint. 61

He suggested three occasions when the Court

57 Id . at 166-67 ("Can a man excuse his [illegal] practices . . . because
of his religious belief? To permit this would be to make the professed
doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect
to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. Government could exist
only in name under such circumstances. lt )
58 133 U.S. 333 (1890) (upholding territorial law denying suffrage to
those who belonged to any organization advocating polygamy as a religious
tenet)
59Hamilton v. Regents of the University of California, 293 U.S. 245, 268
(concurring opinion) (upholding university requirement of participation by
male students in military science and tactics course)

60 304 u.s. 144 (upholding federal regulation against interstate commerce
and fifth amendment challenge)
61 He wrote:
"There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of consti
tutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten Amendments,
which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Four
teenth. . . .
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might shift to the government the burden of proving a statue's validity:

(1)

when the statute appeared on its face to violate the text of the Constitution,
(2)

when the statute restricted democratic processes, and (3) when the statute

was directed against religious and other minority groups.

From the theoreti

cal foundation of this footnote eventually grew the strict scrutiny approach
in both the equal protection and later the free exercise fields.

In fact,

early versions of the least-restrictive-means and compelling-interest stan
dards appeared disparately in two free exercise cases in 1940,62 but they
did not fuse into a uniform doctrine in any single free exercise case.

A loose form of the least-restrictive-means standard did appear in
Cantwell v. Connecticut63 .

In Cantwell three Jehovah's Witnesses challenged

their convictions under a state law conditioning their right to solicit on a
prior governmental conclusion that their religious cause was legitimate.
Invalidating the statute as a censorship of religion and a prior restraint
upon its free exercise, Justice Roberts stated for a unanimous Court that
legislation must be "general and non-discriminatory,,64 to pass free exercise
scrutiny,

But he also asserted that "the power to regulate must be so

"It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts
those political processes [like voting] which can ordinarily be expected to
bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more
exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth
[a]mendment than are most other types of legislation. . . .
"Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the
review of statutes directed at particular religious . • . , or national . . . ,
or racial minorities . . . : whether prejudice against discrete and insular
minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial
inquiry. . . . ft Id. at 152, n. 4

62Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 and Minersville School District
v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586
63 310 U.S. 296 (1940)
64 Id. at 304
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exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end, 11ndulv to infringe the
protected freedom. ,,65

While this criticism of "undue" infringements might

not require the government to apply the means least restrictive of religious
liberty, he was certainly moving the Court in that direction.
In the second case of 1940, Minersville School District ~r. Gobitis,66
the Court hinted at a type of compelling-interest requirement.

In this case

the Court refused to exempt from mandatory flag salutes in public school two
Jehovah's Witness children who believed that their religion prohibited such
salutes.

Justice Frankfurter, writing for a seven-person majority, seemed at

first glance to apply only the secular-purpose and general-applicability
standards. 67

But while Frankfurter cited Reynolds, Davis, and some other

cases to support this free exercise approach, he noted that "[i]n all these
cases the general laws in question . . . were manifestations of specific
powers of government deemed by the legislature essential to secure and
maintain that orderly, tranquil, and free society without which religious
toleration itself is unattainable.,,68

He seemed to place some weight on his

conclusion that the government interest at issue in the case (promoting
national unity) was "inferior to none in the hierarchy of legal values.,,69
Although he did assert that H[tlhe mere possession of religious convictions

65 Id.

66 310 U.S. 586
67 Id • at 594 (The Court had never held free exercise to be infringed by
"legislation of general scope not directed at the doctrinal loyalties of
particular sects. . . . Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the
long struggle for religious toleration, relieved the individual from obedience
to a general law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious
beliefs.")
68 Id.
69 Id . at 595

§ 2.

The Origins of Free Exercise Strict Scrutiny.

21

which contradict the relevant concerns of a political society does not relieve
the citizen from the discharge of political responsibilities",70 Frankfurter
seemed not to conclude simply that the mandatory flag salute was constitution
al because it was a secular, general regulation.

He had qualified his

statement by referring to "the relevant concerns of a political society,,,71
and he stressed that the need to foster national Ilnity was exceedingly
important.

The importance he attached to the governmental interest influenced

his opinion.

Such an influence, though not necessarily a requirement of a

compelling state interest, foreshadowed such a standard.
Despite the Court's endorsement in Cantwell of loose form of the least
restrictive-means criterion, Frankfurter did not apply such a standard in
Gobitis.

Instead, he dodged the criterion, asserting that "the effective

means for [attaining national unity] are still so uncertain and so unauthenti
cated by science as to preclude us from putting the widely prevalent belief in
flag-saluting beyond the pale of legislative power.,,72

Since the Court

"possess[ed] no marked and certainly no controlling competence,,73 in educa
tional matters, it should not make itself "the school board for the coun
try.,,74

The Court's willingness to require a narrowly tailored policy in

CantJ-lell was missing in Gobitis, suggesting perhaps that such willingness

depended on either the Court's self-perceived competence in any particular
field or upon its view of the result it hoped to achieve in any particular
case.

At any rate, Cantwell contained a sort of least-restrictive-means
70 Id. at 594-95
71 Id. (emphasis added)
72 Id . at 598
73 Id. at 597-98
74 Id . at 598
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standard but no requirement of a compelling interest, and in Gobitis the
reverse was true.

But neither of the cases of 1940 can be said to have

completely endorsed a full strict scrutiny approach for free exercise claims.
Stone, however, relied on his footnote in Carolene Products to outline
iust such a doctrine in his dissenting opinion in Gobitis.

He argued that the

Court should hold a governmental policy unconstitutional, despite its general
applicability and secular purpose, if "there were ways enough to secure the
legitimate state end without infringing the asserted immunity" or if "the
inconvenience caused by the inability to secure that end satisfactorily
through other means, did not outweigh freedom of . . . religion.,,7S

The

former of his rules implied a least-restrictive-means requirement and the
latter suggested a standard of heightened importance along the lines of a
compelling interest.

But Stone's Gobitis dissent would have to wait twenty

three years before winning majority status in Sherbert.
Subsequent history soon justified Stone's strong support of religious
liberty and his opposition to the Gobitis judgment.
only three years.

That decision endured for

Gobitis immediately fueled a pre-existing nationwide

movement against the Jehovah's Witnesses. 76

Compulsory flag salutes spread

across the country and were Ucosting Witness children their right to public
education in at least thirty-one states.,,77

Perhaps as a result,78 Jus

tices Black, Douglas, and Murphy, who had joined Frankfurter's Gobitis
opinion, switched sides in 1942 and declared in a dissenting opinion in Jones

7S Id. at 603 (dissenting opinion)
76 n. Manwaring, Render Unto Caesar:

(1962)
77 Id . at 187
78 Id • at 206-07

The Flag-Salute Controversy 163-92
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\'. Opelika 79 their belief that Gobitis had been wrongly decided.

Roosevelt

also replaced two other members of the Court between 1940 and 1942, elevating
Stone to the Chief Justiceship in the process. 80

But even with conversions

and replacements. Stone's position remained a minority view, five-to-four. 81
As a result the Court split five-to-four in Jones and upheld the
application to Jehovah's Witnesses of several local ordinances providing for
flat-rate licensing taxes for itinerant merchants.

Justice Reed, writing for

the majority. assumed that the door-to-door religious solicitation of the
Witnesses was commercial activity.

He also argued that the generally applica

ble tax was more like a neutral time, place, or manner regulation of solicita
tion than a censorship or prohibition of religious exercise.

He found the tax

constitutional.
In dissent Stone and Murphy, joined by Black and Douglas, each contended
that the tax was not a simple time, place, or manner regulation because it did
not regulate anything.
system.

Nor was it a fee to offset the cost of the licensing

For them, it was simply a revenue-generating measure, and as such was

unconstitutional.

They argued that the government could not place a general,

revenue-generating tax on the exercise of a first amendment right, like the
free exercise of religion.

But the minority would have to await either

another conversion by a member of the majority or a replacement on the Court
before attaining majority status.

79Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 623-24 (opinion of Black, J.)
80ln 1941, Roosevelt replaced Justice McReynolds with Justice Byrnes,
and he appointed Justice Jackson to fill Stone's seat when he elevated the
latter to replace Chief Justice Hughes. See H. Abraham, The Judicial Process,
398-403 (1986). Byrnes and Jackson joined with Frankfurter on free exercise
matters. See Jones, 316 U.S. 584.
81Roberts, Reed, Frankfurter, Byrnes, and Jackson, JJ., opposed Stone's
broader reading of the free exercise clause while Black, Douglas, and Murphy,
JJ., supported it. See Jones, 316 U.S. 584.
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Justice Byrnes, appointed only

1941, resigned at the start of the fall 1942 Term. 82

tn

Roosevelt appointed

D.C. Appeals Court Judge Wiley Rutledge 83 to fill Byrnes' vacant seat.
There was little doubt about how Rutledge would have ruled in Jones; in
Murphy's dissent in that case he had approvingly cited a dissenting opinion of
Rutledge in similar case. 84

In fact, the Court granted the challengers in

Jones a rehearing, and by February, 1943, the minority had become a five
person majority.
Before the end of that Term, the Court had vacated its previous judgment
and re-decided Jones per curiam.

In a case presenting the same issues, the

Court explained its rationale and reaffirmed Cantwell's least-restrictive
In this case, Murdock v. Pennsylvania (1943),85 the

means requirement.

Court struck down a flat-rate licensing tax similar to the one at issue in

Jones.

Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, asserted that for ,Jehovah's

Witnesses itinerant solicitation was more a religious activity than a commer
cial one.

And he explained that because the "power to tax the exercise of a

privilege is the power to control or suppress its enjoyment . . . [, a1 state
may not impose a charge for the enjoyment of a right granted by the federal
constitution. ,,86

Finally, Douglas answered Reed's contention that the tax

was valid because it was simply a neutral regulatory device.

Douglas asserted

that the tax would not be valid even if did purport to regulate something
because it was not Ttnarrowly drawn to prevent or control abuses or evils

82 H. Abraham, The Judicial Process, 400 (1986)
83 Id . at 400

84 Jones, supra, n. _, at 614, n. 4
85 319 U.S. 105
86 Id • at 112-13
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Rather, it sets aside the residen

tial areas as a prohibited zone, entry of which is denied [the Witnesses]
unless the tax is paid. '187
unconstitutional:

The indiscriminate nature of the tax rendered it

"A license tax certainly does not acquire constitutional

validity because it classifies the privileges protected by the First Amendment
along with the wares of hucksters and peddlers and treats them all alike.,,8B
Douglas seemed to adopt a least-restrictive-means requirement, the Cantwell
standard that Frankfurter had refused to apply in Gobitis.
But the new majority was not content with that implicit repudiation of

Gobitis.

They explicitly overruled it in another case that term, West

Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (1943).89
the same situation the Court faced in Gobitis:

This case presented

Jehovah's Witness children

sought free exercise exemptions from mandatory flag salutes in public school.
Although the Court did overrule Gobitis, it did not decide Barnette on free
exercise grounds and did not grant the children religious exemptions from the
flag salutes.

As a result, the Court's opinion in Barnette contributed only

brief dicta to the development of free exercise doctrine.
Instead of deciding the case on free exercise grounds, the Court struck
down mandatory flag salutes as a violation of the freedom of speech, conclud
ing that the government could not compel any student, regardless of religious

beliefs, to participate in these patriotic ceremonies.
two reasons for this approach.

There were probably

First, Gobitis was only a three-year-old

precedent, so overruling it would make the Court look suspiciously inconsis

87 Id . at 117
88 Id . at 115

89319 U.S. 624 (1943) (striking down mandatory flag salutes in public
schools)
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the majority may not have wanted to overturn Gobitis,

result~

which was decided by an eight-to-one margin, with the narrow five-to-four
split of Murdock.

Switching the decision to free speech grounds persuaded

Justice Jackson, who had dissented in Murdock, to change sides.
coincidentally~

Barnette.

Perhaps not

Jackson was assigned to write the opinion of the Court in

By taking the free speech approach, the majority was also able to

exploit a point which Frankfurter's opinion in Gobitis had not carefully
evaluated.

Jackson explained in Barnette that Frankfurter had assumed "that

power exists in the State to impose the flag salute upon school children in
general" and then decided the religious question,90

But in Barnette the

Court decided that general power to require the salutes was forbidden by free
speech, so there was no need to consider the question of religious exemptions
from the unconstitutional mandatory flag salute.
Despite the Court's free speech basis for its decision in Barnette,
Jackson sufficiently commented upon Frankfurter's reasoning in Gobitis to
reveal that the new majority rejected his assertion that the Court should
defer to the judgment of school boards because it lacked special competence in
educational matters.

Jackson first noted that school boards as well as

Congress were bound by the Constitution, which it was the Court's duty to
enforce.

He

then went on to refute Frankfurter further, asserting:

Nor does our duty to apply the Bill of Rights to assertions of
official authority depend upon our possession of marked competence
in the field where the invasion of rights occurs. . . .

We

cannot, because of modest estimates of our competence in such
specialties as public education, withhold the judgment that

90 Id . at 635
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history authenticates as the function of this Court when liberty
is infringed. 91
To the extent that Frankfurter's deference on this point undermined an
application of the least-restrictive-means standard in Gobitis, the new
majority might be assumed to have supported that requirement in free exercise
cases.

But Jackson, who had mocked Douglas' application of that standard in

Murdock,92 did not invoke any "narrow tailoring" language in Barnette.
Jackson did imply in dicta the need for a version of a compellinginterest standard in free exercise jurisprudence.

He argued that legitimate

governmental regulation of certain issues included "power to impose all of the
restrictions which a legislature may have a 'rational basis' for
adopting. ,,93
arena:

But this broad power did not extend into the first amendment

"[F]reedoms of speech and of press, of assembly, and of worship may

not be infringed on such slender grounds.

They are susceptible of restriction

only to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the state may
lawfully protect.,,94

This passage represented the toughest statement in

support of a standard like compelling-interest in the free exercise field that
a Court majority had espoused up to that time.

But, once again, neither

Barnette nor Murdock explicitly combined both the least-restrictive-means and
compelling-interest standards in one opinion as a comprehensive free exercise
doctrine leading to the judicial granting of religious exemptions.

That

91 Id . at 639
92Murdock, supra, n. ,at 178 (dissenting opinion) ("If the local
authorities must draw closer aim at evils than they did in these cases I doubt
that they ever can hit them.")
93 Id . at 639

94 Id . (emphasis added)
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r'esult \.{ould not occur until the Court explicitly introduced strict scrutin\'
into the free exercise field twenty years

ater.

Frankfurter, no doubt sensing that eventual result, filed a lengthy
dissent addressing several issues related to strict scrutiny for free exercise
claims and grants of reI

ious exemptions from laws.

He provided perhaps the

most thoughtful and detailed statement of the position opposing strict
scrutiny and free exercise exemptions that any justice has ever delivered.
First, he objected to a system of review whereby challenges under one provi
sion of the Constitution would be scrutinized more carefully than challenges
under another.

He wrote of the requirements of judicial restraint:

There is no warrant in the constitutional basis of this Court's
authority for attributing different roles to it depending upon the
nature of the challenge to the legislation. Our power does not
vary according to the particular provision of the Bill of Rights
which is invoked.

The right not to have property taken without

just compensation has . . . the same constitutional dignity as the
freedom of speech or religious freedom. 95
Frankfurter would not even admit a hierarchy of levels of scrutiny between
purely economic challenges, once used by the Court to invalidate much of the
New Deal, and first amendment freedoms.
In addition, he objected to the whole notion of Court-ordered exemptions
from laws.

The framers, he believed, had never intended the Court to partici

pate in the legislative process.

"It is . . . beyond our power to rewrite the

state's requirement, by providing exemptions. . . .

That wisdom might suggest

the making of such accommodations . . . is outside our province to suggest.
A court can only strike down. . • .

95 Id . at 648 (dissenting opinion)

It cannot make exceptions to a
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He also argued that thp framers never intended to

exempt religious adherents from any law to Hhich they objected.

liThe consti

tutional protection of religious freedom terminated disabiljties, it did not
c rea tene W'

pr

i viI ~ g e s .

It

g a v ere 1

i 0 use '1 uali t y ,

essence is freedom from conformity to rei
conformity to law because of re]

iOlls

ious dogma.,,97

(' i v i 1 i mmlln i tv.

I1 s

dogma, nnt frr>ec!oill from
Frankfurter went on to

assert that if religious liberty meant religiol1s adherents could object to
generall v applicable, secular requirements, then "instead of separation of
church and state, there would be the subordination of the state on any matter
deemed within the sovereignty of the religious conscience. . . .

The validity

of secular laws cannot be measured by their conformity to religious doc
trines.,!98

Finally, Frankfurter noted that a doctrine of exemptions could

not work in a religiously pluralistic society.

In short, he chastised the

majority for simply reading into the Constitution their personal views Ilf the
wisdom of the mandatory flag salute.
One year after Barnette, the Court had another opportunity to formally
adopt strict scrutiny in the free exercise field but did not clearly do so.
In Pr.ince v. Massachusetts,99 a Jehovah's Witness, Sarah Prince, challenged

her conviction under a child labor law.

She had permitted her under-age niece

(and ward), Betty, to accompany her in street solicitation activities.

argued that the law violated her right to instill her religion in
that it violated Betty's right to exercise that religion.

97 Id . at 653
98 Id . at 654
99 321 u.S. 158

and

She asked the Court

to apply a strict scrutiny approach in evaluating her claim.
96 Id. at 651

Betty~

Prince

~

2.

The Origins of Free Exercise Strict Scrutiny.

But

the Court deelined t.) D.pplv ':1t:rl:'t
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'rutin\' and :lpheJd

(':onv i.c t ion on the grounds t ha t t he doc t r i ne (\ f
gr::iiter

pO\..J~r

to restrict the acti\ities of
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parens p/l t r j

mi~lOrs

<1(-'

Priw'e's

ga \!e gove rnment

ihan those of adults.

Justic(' Rutledge, wr ting for the Court, asserted that
rtlhe state's authority over children's activities is broader than

over 1 ike actions of adults.

A democratic society rests,

for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of
voung people into full maturity as citizens, with all that lm
plies.

It may secure this against impeding restraints and dangers

in a broad range of selection. 100
The Court was not willing to demand government to apply the least-restrictive
means when the legislative end related to the protection of children.

As

Justice Jackson noted in dissent, the Court had "draw[nl a line based on
age.,,101

Rutledge did note that if the same statute had been applied to

adults, it would be unconstitutional.

This remark might be taken as an

implicit endorsement of strict scrutiny in cases not involving children.

But

Justice Murphy, who in dissent cited both the Carolene Products footnote and

Barnette's "grave and immediate danger" dicta, was the only member of the
Court to expressly sanction free exercise strict scrutiny.
The Court did not have another real chance to invoke strict scrutiny in
the free exercise field until the early 1960's.
years after Prince.

Chief Justice Stone died two

Truman's appointment of the more conservative Chief

Justice Vinson to replace him probably returned Stone's free exercise majority
to minority status and precluded any radical alteration of free exercise

100 Id . at 168 (emphasis added)
101 Id . at 178
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Bv 1949. T:'uman had repLacer! t:wo more members of Stone's

f~e

exercise group, Justices Murphv and RutJedge, with more conser"ativejustic
es. 103

This Court did not retreat and nverturn

Nurdoc.k

or Barnettp, but Lt:

did not measurabLy extend free exercise doctrine either.
About the

(~losest

the Vinson CClIlrt

came

Niemotko v. Nar.-vland,104 decided in 1951.

to

~u('h "itl

e'\:tf~ns Lnn \·.rtS

In that case, the Court over

turned the convictions of two Jehovah's Witnesses for disorderly conduct.

The

Witnesses had sought to hold religious meetings in a city park, but the Park
Commissioner and city council denied their request.

Although the

itv hall no

permit ordinance, it had traditionally operated under a permit system.

The

Witnesses held their meetings anyway, and their leaders were arrested.
Al though the Court discussed the lack of "narrowly dra\-ln limitations" or any
Hsuhstantial interest of the community,,,105 it based its decision on the
equal protection clause, not free exercise.

Moreover, the Court based its

opinion in a similar case decided at the same time on free speech rather than
free exercise grounds. 106
During the subsequent decade, the Court did not decide any free exercise
cases relevant to the development of strict scrutiny in that field.

As of the

late 1950's, it was clear that the free exercise clause demanded that govern
mental policies infringing religious exercises be generally applicable and
have a secular aim.

The Court had also created two disparate lines of cases

endorsing tougher free exercise standards.

One line, consisting of Cantwell

102 H • Abraham, The Judicial Process, 400 (1986)

103 Id . at 400-01
104 340 U.S. 268

105 Id. at 272
106 Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290
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and Hl1rc/ock, required the government to narrcHdv tailor its poLicies so as to
minimize interference with reI

Ions exercise.

least-restrictive-means standard.

Thjs principle approximated a

At the same time, Gobitis and Barnette

suggested that the government had to demonstrate some important interest to
justi

its infringements of

combination of the two Jines.

n~ligious

1 iberty.

And Prince tacitl,· endorsed a

Apart from dissenting opinions, the Court never

explicitly integrated the two rules into a comprehensive strict scrutiny
doctrine in the free exercise field.
And in the first free exercise case of the 1960's, Bral1nfeld v.

Brown,107 the Court refused to apply strict scrutiny.

In this case, the

Court heard the challenge of an Orthodox Jewish merchant to PennsYlvania's
Sundav Closing Law. 108

Abraham Braunfeld, already required bv his religion

to close his business on Friday night and Saturday, claimed that the state's
requirement that he also close on Sunday threatened his ability to stay in
business.

As a result, Braunfeld argued, the state had violated his right to

free exercise by forcing him to choose between his religious exercise and his
business.

Although a majority of justices could not agree on a rationale, the

Court ruled, seven-to-two, that the interference was justified.
Chief Justice Warren announced the Court's judgment and filed a plural i
ty

op inion for himself and three other justices.

He reaff irmed Cantwe.ll!

5

least-restrictive-means standard but did not require Pennsylvania to demon
strate a compelling interest.

Instead, he introduced a new distinction into

107 366 U.S. 599 (1961)
108 At the same time, other litigants challenged this and other laws as
violations of the establishment clause and equal protection of the laws. The
Court, however, upheld the Sunday Closing Law against both of these challeng
es. McGowan v. Maryland t 366 U.S. 420 (1961), Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super
Market, 366 U.S. 617 (1961)t and Two Guys From Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v.
McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961)
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lenger's religion.

:-;ta utes rhat

om those \vhicf1 hurdened it onlv indirectly.

S(lme relir,ious conduct while an indirec
p ! a (' eli dis -

Ih:~tT.e"'n

(

ha~

0')(::

only

e q u j red b v a {' haL

The Sundav Closing Law at issue did not mandate. that:

Braunfeld open his business on his Sabbath, it only placed a dis-incentive
up 0 n his c hoi c e toe los e .
eli gin U 5 prac t ices.

As are s ul t, ito n 1 v i nd ire c t 1 y bu [(1 e ned hi s

Accord i ng to War ren, the Cour t woul d app 1 y

th('~

Can tt,'e 11

standard to governmental policies that burdened religious exercise onlv
indirectly.

It would not require government to also demonstrate a compelling

interest to justify the indirect interference.
Warren did not precisely

e~plain

It is important to note that

what approach the Court would take when a

policy burdened free exercise directly.

He noted only that such instances

required the "particularly delicate task" of making an "accommodation betltv'een
the reI

ious action and the exercise of state authority.,,109

It was not

clear whether or not he believed the Court should apply strict scrutiny in
cases of direct burdens.
But Warren clearly outlined the Court's method of analysis in cases of
indirect burdens.

He obviously invoked the secular-purpose and general-

applicability standards:

"If the purpose or effect of a law is to

impedf~

observance of one or all religions or is to discriminate invidiously

the

bet~een

religions, that law is constitutionally invalid even though the burden may be
characterized as being only indirect.,,110

Then Warren embraced the least

restrictive-means requirement when challenged legislation met these initial

109Braunfeld, supra, n. _, a t 605
110 Id . at 607

~

L.

The Origins of Free Exercise Strict Scrutiny.

sta.ndards:

It! l]f the St re reg

its pOher, the purpose and effect qf
gOils. t.he

statue is

vaLid rlec.;pitf'

h is

jts

]v

advance the State's secular

indirect burden on

lInless' thp State mav acrompiih'h it'> purpnse

lFV

Thus, \.-Jarr

a burden.

tl)

restated its requirements, adopting them
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inns observance
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too k Ca n t r.,..- L 1 and
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L

the frre exercise test for

policies which indirectly burdened religiously motivated activities.
Rut he helct . unlike the Cantvel1 Court, that the challenged law met

these standards, so he reiected Braunfeld's claim.

Warren cited one of the

other Sunday Closing cases decided on the same day, McGowan v. iVaryland,112
as support for the proposition that Sunday Closing Laws, though once reli
giously based, had evolved into generally applicable, secular regulations.
And although Warren accepted Braunfeld's suggestion that a religious exemption
might be a less restrictive means for some of the state's
grant the exemption.

s, he did not

Warren argued that the state's primary goal was to

provide one commercial-free day to all its citizens and that exemptions,
though less restrictive, would undermine the purpose of the statute.

Forcing

Braunfeld to comply with the Sunday Closing Law was therefore essential to
achieve the legislative end.
exemptions might create.

He also noted other problems that religious

But Warren did not apply the Barnette dicta and

inquire about the importance of the legislative end itself.

A compelling-

interest showing was not part of the plurality's test.
In dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Stewart, asserted that
the Court should have required Pennsylvania to justify its infringement with a
compelling interest.

Brennan first quoted Jackson's Barnette dicta which

111 Id . (emphasis added)
112See supra, n.

~
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10 support
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}

"

fllS rositinn.

::~r('nqc:ln ass2rt,'cl

that thf'se :wrl other precedents shm·;ed (hat the {'flurt had to dppl

v

'.:;tr

scrurlnv in t=,valuat:ini: tree e\ercise (·laLms. and he- did so if! his oFLnion.

He

sllf,gested that Pennsylvania couLd pr'ovide rel igious exemptions dnd still

achieve

a

of requiring each person to rest one day a week.

Sabbatar ans

would simply rest on Saturday and opt Lo work on Sunday while everyone else

rested on Sunday and remained free to \-70rk on Saturday.

Brennan noted that a

number of states applied this scheme without tremendous problems.

Given this

alternative, he could not conclude that the state's additional interest in
providing a day of rest that was uniform was sufficiently compelling to
jllstify the infringement of Braunfeld's religious exercise.

That the burden

on Braunfeld's religious practice was only indirect was irrelevant for
Brerlnan.

He argued that in the case of either a direct or an indirect burden,

the free exercise clause required the Court to apply a compelling-interest

standard in addition to the least-restrictive-means requirement that the
plurality endorsed.

Since Brennan concluded that religious exemptions would

not present any "grave and immediate danger" to the state's interest in
providing that everyone take a day off, and since the state's additional
interest in enforcing uniformity was not compelling, Brennan and Stewart
dissented.
Frankfurter filed an additional opinion concurring in the result.

In

this opinion, which justice Harlan joined, he outlined his own approach to
free exercise claims:

113Braunfeld, supra, n._t at 612
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substantially impede those religious practices, the regulatio!l
.
114
cannot be sustaIned.

frankfurter accepted a least-restricti\'e-means standard, but he qual ified it
bv requiring that the less-restrictive means would still achieve the legisla

tive end "with equal effect. "

He disapproved of Brennan's approach, whereby

the Court would grant an exemption since the state would still be able to
fulfill its general interest in a slightly less effective way.

If the state's

legislative goal was to provide a uniform day of rest, Frankfurter would
evaluate that goal without reference to a less comprehensive goal that
achieved almost the same results.

To make the evaluation Frankfurter proposed

a cost-benefit analysis to weigh the relative importance of the
end in the event that no less-restrictive means were available.

legislat~ve

He was

willing to strike down a statute if the burden upon free exercise was greater
than the benefit gained by achieving the "community interest s !l115 repre
sented by the statute.

Frankfurter relied on arguments identical to Warren's

to conclude that religious exemptions would not be effective alternative means
but would frustrate the government's ability to achieve its secular end.
Going beyond Warren, Frankfurter purported to balance the community benefit of

114McGowan v. Maryland, supra, n.
in judgment)
115 Id • at 522

,at 462 (Frankfurter, J., concurring
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the statute against the cost: t.11 Ule inrii\ idual, and, not surprisingL\-, he
found that the community benefits outweigheri the ~ndividual costs. 116
As a result of the fractured Court in Braunfelrl and the new directindirect distinction of the plurality opinion, free exercise jurisprudr-'>rlce was
1esc; (' J ear- after Braunfeld than before the case was dpcidert,

The inahilitv of

any position to gain a majority suggested that Braunfeld would not become a
very important precedent.

In fact, within two years after the Court's

decision in Braunfeld, Justice Goldberg had replaced Frankfurter, and Brennan
had apparently persuaded Warren and two other members of the plurality to
accept his free exercise position.

When the Court decided Sherbert in 1963,

it adopted Brennan's approach in Braunfeld as the majority position, seven-to
two.

The opinion in Sherbert, which Brennan wrote, brought the compelling-

interest and least-restrictive-means standards together, establishing strict
scrutiny in the free exercise field for the first time.

116Frankfurter did not specifically note how he weighed the individual
costs of potential eternal damnation or bankruptcy for Braunfeld against the
community interests of a day of rest. In fact, he seemed merely to downplay
the individual costs and overstate the benefits. At the same time he warned
against justices' applying their own personal opinions, a possibility to which
his cost-benefit analysis seemed to provide an open invitation.

18

§ 3.

THE RISE OF FREE EXERCISE STRICT SCRUTINY.
Although the Court introduced strict scrutiny into the free exercise

field in Sherbert (1963),117 it did not definitively establish the doctrine
in this case.

The Court's opinion in Sherbert left some questions regarding

the proper application of strict scrutiny in the free exercise field.

The

Court gradually clarified its position on free exercise strict scrutiny over
the subsequent years and fully installed the doctrine by 1981. 118
In Sherbert, the Court heard the case of Adell Sherbert, a Seventh-Day
Adventist who lost her job because she refused to work on Saturdays when her
employer extended the work week of all its employees to six days,
Carolina denied her request for unemployment compensation.

South

The state denied

benefits to unemployed individuals who were not "available for work."

Because

Sherbert was willing to accept work only if it did not require Saturday labor,
the state decided that she did not meet its employment availability require
ment.

She challenged the denial of unemployment benefits as a violation of

her right to the free exercise of religion, and the Court agreed, applying
strict scrutiny to do so.
Although a Court majority decided to rule in Sherbert's favor, it also
apparently refused to overturn Braunfeld.

This refusal created problems for

117 374 U.S. 398
118 See Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.s. 707 (1981), McDaniel v. Paty,
435 U.s. 618 (1978), and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.s. 205 (1971)
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Brennan, who wrote the majority opinion in Sherbert.
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His primarv

of

course was to expressly install strict scrutiny in free exercise jurispru
dence.

But the Court majority constrained his ability to clearly establish

that doctrine because Brennan also had to attempt to distinguish Braunfeld to
maintain its validity.

On the surface, Brennan's opinion read like a flow

chart for deciding free exercise cases.

But just underneath the surface lay

contradictions and qualifications that undermined Brennan's goal of establish
ing strict scrutiny as the primary method of evaluating free exercise claims.
Brennan first noted that there were some forms of conduct, like polyga
my, which the free exercise clause did not protect.

In those cases, the Court

would simply uphold any statute that prevented anyone, including a reI

ious

adherent, from performing such conduct as a religious rite or otherwise.
Sherbert's abstinence from Saturday labor, however, was protected because it
did not "pose[] some substantial threat to public safety, peace or
order.,,119

So government could not enact legislation aimed at preventing

Sherbert from abstaining from Saturday labor.

Any infringement of her

religious practice had to be an incidental effect of a secular regulation, as
it was in the case at hand.
Then, Brennan faced a problem.

According to Braunfeld, if a generally

applicable, secular policy indirectly burdened an individual's free exercise,
it was not valid unless the government could show that it had employed the
least-restrictive means possible to achieve its legislative end.

If no less

restrictive means were available, however, Braunfeld did not sanction a free
exercise approach under which the Court could also require the government to
justify its indirect burden on free exercise by showing that it fulfilled some
compelling interest.
119 Id . at 403

If the burden were direct, the Court might apply a
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compelling-interest standard, but Braunfeld was not clear on this point.

At

any rate, although Sherbert presented only an indirect burden, Brennan wanted
to establish full strict scrutiny, including a compelling-interest standard.
In order to both sanction free exercise strict scrutiny and also respect

Braunfeld, Brennan produced a vague opinion which could be read in two ways,
depending on which passages were emphasized.

On one level, he seemed to apply

a full strict scrutiny approach, as though Braunfeld had never been decided.
He first had to determine whether or not South Carolina's availability
requirement, as interpreted by the state, burdened Sherbert's religion.
Brennan decided that the denial of benefits, an indirect burden similar to the
one in Braunfeld, did infringe Sherbert's free exercise rights.

It forced her

to choose between adhering to her tenet of faith, foregoing Saturday labor,
and sacrificing benefits on one hand or violating a tenet of her religion in
order to receive unemployment benefits.

For Brennan, "such a choice puts the

same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed
against [Sherbert] for her Saturday worship.,,120

So he concluded that

South Carolina's disqualification provision, when applied against Sherbert,
did burden her right to free exercise, if only indirectly.
Brennan then seemed to completely ignore Braunfeld's distinction between
direct and indirect burdens, holding that South Carolina had to demonstrate

that including Sherbert's religiously based abstinence within the meaning of
the disqualification provision was justified by some compelling interest.
This consideration would seem to contradict the rule of adjudication estab
lished in Braunfeld for instances of indirect burdens.

At any rate, the state

argued that protecting its unemployment compensation fund from fraudulent
claims was compelling.
120 Id • at 404

But Brennan announced that the Court would not deter
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mine whether or not any compelling interest existed because the state supreme
court had not considered the question.

~oting

that many states provided

exemptions for Sabbatarians, Brennan did make clear that the Court would not
accept any asserted governmental interest as compelling.

He remanded the case

to the state court and implied that if that court did not exempt Sherbert from
the disqualification provision, the Supreme Court would do so on appeal.
Brennan declined to evaluate the assertion of compelling interest in deference
to the state court, but his opinion expressly sanctioned the use of strict
scrutiny in the free exercise field.
While on this superficial level Brennan's opinion appeared to represent
a straightforward endorsement of strict scrutiny, it contained inconsistencies
and qualifications just below the surface.

These flaws in his ruling,

resulting from his attempts to distinguish Braunfeld, rendered the opinion a
less than clear approval of strict scrutiny.

Although Brennan seemed to

eliminate the distinction between direct and indirect burdens, he noted that

Braunfeld was still valid because the burden in that case had been less direct
than the one in Sherbert.

But the directness of the burden was irrelevant

under the test he applied in Sherbert, so he could not legitimately distin
guish Braunfeld on that ground.

And his contradictory statement left some

question about the potential of continued soundness for the direct-indirect
distinction in the free exercise field.

Although the Court noted that the

burden in Sherbert was indirect, it applied strict scrutiny to find it
unconstitutional.

But by also claiming that Braunfeld was still a valid

precedent, the Court left open the possibility that some challenges to
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indirect burdens might be evaluated according to the less stringent

do(·t~ine

applied in Braunfeld. 121
Brennan also tried to distinguish Braunfeld in another way:

by stretch

ing the facts in Sherbert to suggest that the disqualification provision was
not generally applicable but was in fact discriminatory.

In Braunfeld. \<Jarrcn

lad announced a specific test only for instances when some generally applica
ble and secular governmental policy indirectly burdened religious exercise.
Warren, it will be recalled, did not clearly articulate standards for cases in
which the burden was indirect but the legislation was discriminatory or non
secular.

Nor did he outline a precise judicial approach in cases of direct

burdens on free exercise.

Brennan apparently tried to cast the disqualifica

tion provision in Sherbert as discriminatory so as to avoid applying the
Braunfeld test that did not include a compelling-interest standard.

In fact,

he quoted as relevant to Sherbert a portion of Braunfeld which suggested that
discriminatory policies were always invalid, but he ignored the sentence
immediately following the portion he quoted.

That sentence outlined the

least-restrictive-means approach for generally applicable policies but did not
endorse a compelling-interest standard.

Brennan seemed to be writing his

Sherbert opinion so that if it were read on a deeper level, and were directly
compared with Braunfeld, one might conclude that Sherbert defined strict

scrutiny as the proper judicial approach when cases involved discriminatory or
121It could be argued that Brennan's dispute with Chief Justice Warren's
plurality opinion in Braunfeld was based not on the plurality's refusal to
apply strict scrutiny but on their acceptance of the state's asserted inter
ests as compelling when Brennan did not believe that they were. But this
interpretation of the disagreement in Braunfeld does not comport with Warren's
plurality opinion or with Brennan's urging from dissent that precedent
required a showing of compelling interest. Given the clarity with which
Warren outlined the criteria that the Court should apply in cases like
Braunfeld, it would be a stretch to assume that the majority really used a
compelling-interest standard but did not explicitly announce that they were
using it.
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non-secular legislation that indirectly burdened free exercise.
~ords,

Brennan would be filling one of the holes

~hich

In other

Warren left open in

Braunfeld.
Brennan's suggestion that the disqualifying provision
was based on two propositions, neither of which were sound.

~as

disrriminatorv

First, he

asserted that although the state court had held that Sherbert's religious
reason for refusing Saturday work disqualified her, the court had not ruled
out the possibility that it might exclude from the disqualification provision
other, perhaps non-religious, personal reasons for refusing Saturday work.
The state's decision to disqualify Sherbert might then constitute religious
discrimination, and the provision might fail the general-applicability
requirement.

Justice Harlan objected in dissent to Brennan's assumption that

"some day" the state court might "conclude that there is some personal reason"
that would not disqualify an individual. 122

Harlan noted that the state

court had never held any personal reason as an acceptable basis for someone to
condition their availability for work.

He suggested that the majority should

not assume that it would ever do so.
Second, Brennan tried to show that the scheme was discriminatory by
referring to another South Carolina law that protected individuals from being
compelled to work on Sunday if such work would violate their religion.
However, Harlan again effectively attacked Brennan's claim.

He pointed out

that this law was not part of the unemployment statutes at issue and in fact
only had force in times of national emergency when the state authorized
employers to operate on Sunday.

Nevertheless, it seemed that Brennan was

trying to paint the disqualification provision as discriminatory so that

Braunfeld would not require him to apply a free exercise doctrine that
122 Id . at 420, n. 1 (Harlan,

J., dissenting)
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excluded the compelling-interest standard.
his suggestion that the provision

~as

But Urennan did not incorporate

discriminatory into his formulation of

the strict scrutiny approach he sanctioned.

His opinion did not even imply

that the Court would apply strict scrutiny only if challenged legislation

~ere

discriminatory,
Flawed by Brennan's messy attempts to save Braunfeld, the Sherbert
opinion left confusion in the free exercise field.

While denying that

Braunfeld was overruled, the Court adopted an approach that was at odds with
that case unless Sherbert were narrowly read as filling a hole left by Warren
in Braunfeld.

But if Sherbert were read in such a way, it would produce

several questions.
still be valid.

The distinction between direct and indirect burdens might

After all, since Sherbert did not address a direct burden,

its strict scrutiny doctrine might not apply in cases containing such a
burden.

And since Sherbert distinguished Braunfeld as presenting a less

direct burden, it might suggest that when future courts heard free exercise
challenges they might have to apply the less comprehensive test announced in

Braunfeld when burdens could be deemed less direct than the one in Sherbert.
Sherbert might also require that future courts distinguish between indirect
burdens resulting from general laws and those arising from discriminatory
legislation.

Full strict scrutiny might apply only when legislation was

discriminatory and placed indirect burdens on free exercise.

Brennan's

attempts to save Braunfeld substantially undermined his goal of firmly
establishing strict scrutiny in Sherbert as the predominant doctrine in the
free exercise field.
Justice Harlan dissented in Sherbert.

He had joined Frankfurter's

concurring opinion in Braunfeld, and with Frankfurter now retired Harlan led
the anti-exemptions camp.

He criticized the Sherbert majority for both
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contradicting Braunfeld and reaching an illegitimate result.

45

He couirt not

understand Brennan's position that the burden in Braunfeld was less direct
than the one in Sherbert.

After all. the Sunday Closing Law threatened to

drive Braunfeld out of business, but Sherbert merely wanted to collect several
weeks of unemployment compensation.

Harlan thought that "any differences

between this case and Braunfeld cut against [Sherbert]. ,,123

Justice Ste~7-

art, in a concurring opinion, made the same argument about Braunfeld's
burden. 1?4
-

Harlan also disagreed with the result of applying the strict

scrutiny approach, a result he believed was discriminatory.

He asserted that

"[t]he meaning of today's holding . . . is that the State must furnish
unemployment compensation benefits to one who is unavailable for work if the
unavailability stems from the exercise of religious convictions.

The State,

in other words, must single out for financial assistance those whose behavior
is religiously motivated, even though it denies such assistance to others
whose identical behavior . . . is not religiously motivated. u125

This

"accommodation of religion,,126 would be "permissible,,127 if the legisla
ture had chosen to enact it.

But Harlan's point was that they had not, that

123 Id . at 421 (Harlan, J., dissenting)

124Brennan's majority opinion was flawed, but this criticism was not
necessarily legitimate. Harlan and Stewart seemed to regard the severity of
the burden and the directness of the burden as the same concept. But they are
not necessarily synonymous. The consequences of the burden in Braunfeld were
clearly more potentially severe than those in Sherbert. However, the burden
in Sherbert might be considered more direct. In Sherbert, South Carolina
denied Sherbert a governmental benefit, unemployment compensation. But in
Braunfeld, the Sunday Closing Law limited Braunfeld's ability to reap economic
benefits generated in the private sector. Government was responsible for the
burden in both cases, but the burden in Sherbert could conceivable have been
seen as more direct.
125 Id • at 422 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original)

126 I d.
127 Id .

~
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the unemployment compensation legislation had heen designed and interpreted tn
provide assistance solely to individuals whose unemployment resulted from
downturns in the business cycle.

He simplv believed that instances "in which

the Constitution may require special treatment on account of religion are
. few and far between. .

tl128

Although Harlan did not think exemptions were required, he did not
believe legislatively crafted ones would violate the establishment clause.

He

did not assail the Court for fueling a conflict between the two religion
clauses, but Justice Stewart did.

Stewart, who had joined Brennan's dissent

in Braunfeld, strongly supported the pro-exemptions position in the free
exercise field.

But he decried the "positively wooden,,129 interpretation

he believed the Court had given the establishment clause in other cases,
particularly in School District v. Schempp,130 which the Court had decided
on the same day as Sherbert.

In that case the Court had concluded that "to

withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular
legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
religion.,,131

Stewart asserted that as a result of this kind of construc

tion of the establishment clause "there are many situations where legitimate
claims under the Free Exercise Clause will run into head-on collision with the
Court's insensitive and sterile construction of the Establishment
Clause.!l132

Sherbert was just such an instance.

Stewart argued that under

the Court's approach to the establishment clause, South Carolina should be
128 Id . at 423
129 Id . at 414 (Stewart, J., concurring)

130 374 U.S. 203 (1963)

131 Id . at 222
132 Id .
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forced to treat Sherhert' s rei i,gious reasor; for qual j fvin,o.; her empir}\'men!

availability in the same
Ing avaiLability.

~av

it treated anv other personal reason for qualifv

"To require South Carol ina to so administer its laws as to

pay public money to [Sherbertl is . . . clearly to require the State to

\' oL1.te the Estahlishment Clans("" as construeri by this Court. ,,1~H

Since, he

argued, the Court had disapproved of governmental support of religion, it
contradicted the establishment clause when it ordered a free exercise exemp
tion so that Sherbert could receive unemployment compensation.

Because

Stewart supported religious exemptions, he believed the Court should alter its
interpretation of the establishment clause to eliminate the conflict between
the two clauses and to clearly permit legislative bodies to respect religious
diversity by granting statutory exemptions.
The majority's response to Stewart's criticism was anemic.

The majority

obviously did not want to engage in a careful scrutiny of their free exercise
and establishment clause doctrines.

Brennan, in the majority opinion, did not

apply the Schempp doctrine to determine whether or not a religious exemption
would in fact be unconstitutional.

Instead, he simply called the exemption

"nothing more than the governmental obligation of neutrality in the face of
religious differences.,,134

Douglas filed a concurrence to address the

question of potential conflicts between Sherbert and the establishment clause.
He asserted that
[t]he fact that government cannot exact from me a surrender of one
iota of my religious scruples does not, of course, mean that I can
demand of government a sum of money, the better to exercise them.
For the Free Exercise Clause is written in terms of what the
133 Id . at 415
134 Id . at 409 (opinion of the Court)
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cannot du

a tile individuaL, nut in

tf~rm..:;

of ,,'ha' the

1 J ...

individual can exact from the government.')
For Douglas, Sherbert was not attempting to exact a
u der

til

S:lm

from the state in

hetter exercise her religion, she was simply seeking unemployment

/lenefits as an unemployed worker.

But he failed to address the fact that the

state had disqualified her for benefits because her unemployment resulted from
a personal objection.

The Court had ruled that states could not deny compen

sation when unemployment resulted from religious practices.
statements similar to those of Douglas.

Brennan incll1ded

He suggested that there was no

conflict between the religion clauses because the Court had not required
states to create unemployment compensation schemes for individuals who became
unemployed because of adherence to their religious beliefs.

The Court had

simply ruled that if the states chose to create unemployment compensation
systems, they could not deny compensation when unemployment resulted from
religious practices.

But Brennan's argument forced him to further explain

that the case might have been decided differently or a conflict might have
arisen if "an employee's religious convictions serve to make him a nonproduc
tive member of society.,,136

Harlan rightly attacked this "rather startling

disclaimer,,137 in Brennan's opinion.

Harlan believed that drawing such

distinctions between types of religious adherents was very "inappro
priate.,,138

At any rate, the majority really did not address the thrust of

the criticism, that the Court had apparently singled out Sherbert, to use
Harlan's words, and excluded her from the disqualifying provision because her
135 Id . at 412 (Douglas, J., concurring)

136 374 U.S. at 410
137 374 U.S. at 420, n. 2
138 Id.

~
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That
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reason, Stewart argued, the exemption contradicted the establishment clause.
In sum, Sherbert stands as a confusing precedent.

It di.d

es!~ablish

strict scrutiny in the free exercise field, but it also includect contra/lic
tions and quaLifications that left two main questions ahout the precjse
application of the doctrine.

First, did strict scrutinv apply when free

exercise burdens were direct as well as indirect?

And, secondly, did tne

doctrine also apply when indirect burdens resulted from generally applicable
secular regulations as well as allegedlv discriminatory ones?

The Court wOllld

suggest answers to these questions in subsequent cases, but the Court did not
completely clarify the free exercise fieJd until 1981.
In addition to the questions of application, Sherhert also intensified
the potential conflict between the two reI

ion clauses without effectivelY

explaining a doctrinal solution to that problem.

In a series of casps

beginning in 1965 and dealing with draft exemptions, the potential for
conflict became very real.

But the Court again avoided directly addressing

it.

These cases did not significantly add to the development of free
exercise jurisprudence, but they did serve to point out the potential conflict
between the two religion clauses in the area of religious draft exemptions.
They also highlighted the Court's difficulties in defining reI

ion.

That

definitional problem rendered the Court extremely cautious in evaluating
claims in the religion fields.

The draft cases were based on the conscien

tious ohjector provision of the federal selective service law.

This provision

provided that the draft Jaw did not "require any person to be subject to
combatant training and service in the armed forces . . . who, b.v reason of

religious train.ing and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation In

individual's belief i.n a reLJtlnn to

it

SurJrpme Bping

involving duties superior

to those arising from ar1\' h1lman reLation, but rioes notincllJ(fe essenti ii'v

pol i tic a 7. soc i 0 log i cal,

0r

philo ,(:; 0 phi c a j

, .j

e r,7<:;

0

ram e r' (1 1 r per.'i n nam' r: Ii

raispd potentiallv serious first amendment quec.;tions, but the r'ourt
avoided de,1.ling ,,-lith them.

.c~ener;{11v

Howe\er. concurring and dissentin:; opini(lw,:;, taken

to;;ether, reveaJ ed the grave nature (If the potential confliet heth'een the
clauses.

rn

co
<}efc:lger

V.

U"n.lte.d S tates ( 1"6
-)
. d'IVl. d ua 1 vIO
h "-'as convlctec
.
1
'1
j , 1{fa an In

for refusing to submit to induction challenged the provision as a violation of
the estahlishment clause, free exercise, and equal protection.

The lower

court hi-ld helrl that the provision's "Supreme Being" reference excluded
r's non-theistic religion, so he challenged the provision as religjousl v
discriminatory.
t

The Court dodged the constitutional issue\ however, and held

hat even t'hough the provision did mention "Supreme Being, I' its scope was not

Limited only to individuals who adhered to theistic religious sects.

'fhe

Court gave a broad interpretation to the statutory definition of religion,
requiring administrators of the provision to ask whether or not "the claimed
belief occup[ied] the same place in the life of the objector as an orthodox
belief in God h[eld] in the life of one clearJy qualified for exemp
tion.,,141

Justice Douglas suggested in a concurring opinion that the free

exercise clause and equal protection required the Court to apply this broad

139Quoted in Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 336 (1970) (emphasis
added)
14°380 U.S. 163
141 Id. at 184
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definition of reI
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Scrutiny,
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It e f i Tl i t ion ~'J a s so broad that l t m

even have included the beliefs based on

"political~

r: t

sociological, or philo

sophical views" that the provision expressly exrluded, though U;e Court
claimed it did not.
The Court majority riisi.ntegrated whiLe addressing the same issue in
f/e Ish

v . Unit e d S tat e oS (1 970 ). 1 4 3

I nth i seasean ind i v i d ua 1

',J

h0 \~. a s (' 0 n

vic ted for refusing to submit to the draft challenged government's refusal to
classify him as a conscientious obiector.

At first he denied that his beliefs

"lere religious, having been formed IItby reading in the fields of histnry and
sociology. 11,144

But in light of the Court's broad statutory interpretation

of religious beliefs in Seeger, Welsh decided that his beliefs Here in fact
religious.

A plurality of four, Justice Black writing the

opinion~

stretched

the statutory provision to include Welsh's beliefs, which were clearly
grounded in secular sources.

The plurality again denied that it was effec

tively deleting the statutory exclusion of purely "political, sociological, or
philosophical views."

But it mav have clone just that.

Justice Harlan concurred in the result but refused to join the plural
ity's extension of the statutory definition of religion.

He argued that the

Court had effectively included non-religious beliefs within the meaning of the
conscientious objector provision.

Harlan concurred in the result because he

analyzed the claim under the establishment clause.

Although he believed that

Congress would be upholding "neutrality" if it refused to grant any draft
exemptions, Harlan concluded that once it chose to grant conscientious
exemptions, Congress could not restrict the exemption system to include only
142 Id • at 188

143 396 U.S. 333
144 Id . at 341 (quoting brief for appellant)
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limit the exemption to reI

Strict Scrutiny.
'1n r ' "(I \ - e ;', ben (-' Lrl t h are 0 n g res s c [) 111 d no t

iOllsly

motivated conscientious objection.

eve n

For

Harlan, onre Congress decided to exempt conscientious ol>jectors from militarY
service, it could not dis riminate against individuals Fhose conscientiiJ'JS
o hj ec t ion to war

\.-ias

s i neere though no t ground ed in

rp

10

n.

Ha r Li:l n Ion (' 1 u:i

ed that the non-discrimination requirement of the establishment clause
rendered unconstitutional the exclusion of purely "pol tical. sociological, or
philosophical views" from the conscientious objector provision because it
preferred religion over non-religion.

He relied on Schempp and other rases to

support his position.
Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Stewart, dissented.
Thev believed that Welsh's beliefs were secular and consequently outside the
scope of the conscientious objector provision.
responded to Harlan's concurrence.

White's opinion primarily

White noted that Harlan's condemnation of

religious exemptions as discrimination was unfounded since "the First Amend
ment itself contains a religious classification.,,145

The potential for

conflict between the religion clauses became clear in White's contemplation ot
the proper meaning of governmental "neutrality" toward religion:
We have said that neither support nor hostility, but neutrality, is the
goal of the First Amendment.
defining,

"Neutrality," however, is not self

If it is "favoritism" and not "neutrality" to exempt reI i

gious believers from the draft, is it "neutral ity" and not "inhibition"
of religion to compel religious believers to fight when they have
special reasons for not doing so, reason to which the Constitution gives
particular recognition?146
145 Id . at 372 (White, J., dissenting)
146 Id.
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It \·;ould be Logically impossihle to comi)i.rlr the -;;;trict establishment posi' ion
I)f

the Court in Schempp with the highl

in Sherbert.

y

accnmmodating

fp>e

exercise posit ior:

Either accommodations fif rei i,gion were permissible under the

estahlishment clause to some extent and the
.1nd State

,,147 could not he absolute, or the separa.t I on '·ias

accommodation was impermissible.

nmplet

ann

The Court admitted that it "has struggled to

find a neutral course between the two Religion Clauses, both of

~hich

are cast

in absolute terms, and either of which, if expanded to a logical extreme,
would tend to clash with the other.,,148

The real problem seemed to be that

if the Court's establishment clause precedents were taken to their logical
extreme, they would prohibit both free exercise and statutory religious
exemptions.

To avoid this conclusion, the Court did not adhere rigidly to

those precedents, but with no systematic way to determine when those prece
dents controlled and when thev did not, the Court made ad hoc decisions.
probably depending on the result the justices wanted to reach.

The Court

labelled some accommodations "benevolent neutrality,,149 while striking
others as "establishments of religion.,t150

The problem was that

dC1I:n

stabLish

ment doctrine was theoretically absolute but its application was arbitrary.
In theory free exercise exemptions would contravene establishment doctrine,
but the Court chose not to apply the doctrine to reach that conclusion. 151

147Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (quoting Thomas
Jefferson)
148 Wal z v. Tax Comm 'n , 397 U. S. 664, 668 - 6 9 (1 970 )
149 Id • at 669

150 See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971 )
151 A detailed discussion of the potential conflict between the two
clauses and their corresponding judicial doctrines is beyond the scope of this
paper. These draft cases should demonstrate that the possibility is quite
real.
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pation in \.Jar in any form,"

they Here outside the consci0.ntiolls objector

provision of the draft law.

As a result, they arguert that the provision

violated both reLigion

lauses because it: discriminated among rcljgLolls sects.

The Court obviously could not agree with them because it had painted
i tsplf into a corner with Seeger and (.,reish.

The Court had construed the

COIlscienLious objection provision so that it came perilouslv close to exempt
ing from military service individuals who possessed non-religious objections
~ar.

to all
bet~een

If the Court were also to hold unconstitutional the distinction

comprehensive and selective objection, it would virtuallY transform

the United States military into a volunteer force because consistency might
then demand that non-religious, selective objectors couJd not be compellerl to
serve.

If an individual's objection to the Vietnam war "occup[ied] the same

place in the life of the objector as an orthodox belief in God h[eld] in the
life of one who clearly qualified for exemption",154 he could be entitled
to an exemption.
The Court devoted much of its Gillette opinion to the establishment
question, but it also analyzed the free exercise claim.
did little to clarify the Sherbert opinion.
152 401 U.S. 437

153Negre v. Larson
154 Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184 (1965)

However, the Court

Justice Marshall, writing the
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The Court's fear of a fLood of claims. both legjtimatc and fraudu

res t r a i ned i tin Gj 11 e t t e.

But at 1 e as ton e 1ower

manprHier ar;-,;umr'nt nnt to be compel ing. 159

And
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t had f
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~xemptions

per se.

the

concern ahout fr;:1,uci1l1 ent

claims was not a cHse-specific compell ng interest but was an argument
religious

[flf

agai~st

If the Court were going to accept that argument

in Gillette, honesty should have demanded that it ahandon strict scrutiny

15 t must be recalled that a conclusion about whether or not "raisfingl
and "illpport ingj armies," {'.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 12, was a compelli.ng
interest did nut satisfy the strict scrutiny doctrine. ~ot only did the

overall goal have to be compelling, but there also had to he a more specific,
rompelling reason not to exempt religious adherents whose free exercise a
challenged statute burdened.
156 Id . at 462
157 Id . at 462
158 Id. at 456

159 In United States v. NcFadden~ 309 F.Supp. 502 (D. N. Calif. 1970) the
district court heard a claim almost identical to that in lVegre (Gillette's
companion case). It held that the free exercise clause required exemptions
for selective objectors. The district judge noted that the pool of draft-age
men would increase from 121 million in 1965 to 18t million by 1980 with that
gain perhaps offsetting the exemption of selective objectors. He also
suggested that before selective objectors were drafted, government ought to
pursue the less-restrictive means of revoking college deferments (then
numbering around two million) and should activate the additional two million
men in the active and standby reserves. Although the district judge did not
suggest the possibility of drafting women, that course too would provide a
means less-restrictive of religious liberty than drafting selective objectors.
It would also eliminate questions of sex discrimination and the draft. See
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (upholding requirement that only males
register with the selective service system)
t
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(~xemptions

tor select-ivc

objectors "would involve a [pal danger of prrati," or e"('D di3crimlnator
dcr'ision-ma.ldn;;s in administrative' practice.,,161

probabl Y not completely unjustified, he

\eTaS

\·:hi!p his

us lng this

~:a,s

COflC{,C!

appreh~'nsi:)n

hypothetical, administrative religious discrimination to jus ify an
statutory discrimination on the basis of rel.igions beliefs.
view the case in this way because hp appJ ied

Ii

thO:lt

~vident

But be did

n~)t

very restrictive notion of

religious discrimination to the facts of the case and found that the conscien
tiOllS objection provision was not discriminatory on its face. 162

~arshall

also accepted government's assertion that exemptions for selective objectors
might threaten the morale of those called to serve.

Again, at least one

district conrt had considered that argument and had determined that it

\..;a<;

:wt

160The district court in l1cFadden also noted that the Supreme Court, in
both Sherbert and Seeger~ had already rejected the contention that preventing
fraudulent claims was a sufficiently compelling interest to justify an
infringement of free exercise. 309 F.Supp. 502, 508
161 Id • at 455

162He denied that the draft law was facially discriminatory because it
"does not discriminate on the basis of religious affiliation or religious
belief, apart of course from beliefs concerning war. . . . [It] does not
single out any religious organization or religious creed for special treat
ment." Id. at 450-51 (emphasis added). This incredibly narrow view of
religious discrimination was so superficial as to be almost disingenuous.
That the statute classified individuals on the basis of differences in their
individual religious beliefs rather than differences in their sectarian
affiliations does not seem especially significant. The statute granted an
exemption to individuals whose religious beliefs led them to oppose all wars
but denied the exemption to other individuals whose religious beliefs led them
to oppose a particular war. The discrimination on the basis of religion was
obvious.
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compelling,163

Some of the interests ~arshall accepted as iustifications

of the infringement of free exercise might be seen as compelling, but not
convincingly so.

In fact, Marshall's shot-gun approach. accepting a mYriad of

compelling interests, might suggest that: he was uncomfortable ,,>lith relYing on
anyone as being definitivel)" compelling.

Moreover, Marshall made no a temp

to determine whether or not government could use some less restrictive means
to achieve its goals. 164

Therefore, Gillette did not stand as a clear and

strong application of strict scrutiny.

It represented the Court's reluctance

to grant exemptions in the face of several inherent problems with the doc
trine, as well as the Court's great deference to Congress in military matters.

Gillette really did not answer any of the questions arising out of Sherbert
and, consequently, did not help to clarify free exercise jurisprudence.
However, in 1972, t he Court decided Wisconsin

F.

Yoder165 and made

clear that strict scrutiny was a predominant free exercise approach.

In this

case Amish parents challenged Wisconsin's compulsory education law, under
which the state had fined them for withdrawing their children from school
they reached the age of sixteen.

bf~fore

The Amish parents believed that

spnding their children to secondary school would violate their religious
tenets.

They believed that while their children needed an elementary educa

tion, secondary education would instill in them the sinful values of the
modern world and would lead them to abandon their faith.
gious exemptions from the compulsory education law.

They sought reli

The Court, applying

strict scrutiny, granted their request for exemptions.
163The court in McFadden thought it "quite obvious that men who are
drafted in opposition to deep-seated convictions do not make good soldiers"
and would cause morale problems for the military. 309 F.Supp. 502, 507-08

164 See n. _, supra.
165 406 U.S. 205
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Yoder settled one of the issues left unclear bv 8herhert.

genera~l

,

Yoder tau,'?;ht that

whE'n the Court heard a challenge to;1 statute v:hich "las generally applicahle
and burdened free exercise directly, it would apply strict scrutiny.
had aIr e. ad y s h cn; n a l l e a s t t hat the Co u r t

\-:0 U J d

a 1 s (1

Sherbert

v t he doc t r i ne \·,:hef;

discriminatory legislation hurdeneci free exercise only indirectly.

The

combinat ion of Yoder and Sherbert \.;ould require the Court to addl tionally
apply strict scrutiny when discriminatory legislation burdened free exercise
directly.

So the only real question remaining unanswered after Yoder was

whether the Court would apply strict scrutiny when generally applicable
legislation burdened free exercise only indirectly or retain the less strict

Braunfeld test in those instances.
Chief Justice Burger. writing for the six-to-one majority in Yoder,
reaffirmed a broad interpretation of Sherbert, noting that "only those
interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance
..
.
.
c 1 alms
to t h e f ree exerclse
1.egltlmate

0 fl
re"19lon.

,,166

This sentence was

but a restatement of the least-restrictive-means and compelling-interest
standards.

Furthermore, Burger swept aside contentions that because the

compulsory attendance law was secular and generally applicable it did not
violate Yoder's free exercise rights:
[T]his case [cannot] be disposed of on the grounds that [the law]
applies uniformly to all citizens of the State and does not, on
its face, discriminate against religions or a particular religion,
or that it is motivated by legitimate secular concerns.

A regula

tion neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless

166 Id . at 215
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the consti tut iona t rer;uir<C'Inent tor government;d neutrali t\'

[toward religion] if it unduly burdens the free exercise of
religion. 167
So with Yoder, strict scrutiny was well on its way to becoming a comprehensive
doctrine for evaluating most free exercise violations.
The Court held that the state's compulsory attendance law was not
essential to achieve some compelling interest.

The state had argued that its

interest in preparing the children to be self-reliant and to participate in
the political process justified the requirement.

Burger, noting that the

Amish were "productive and law-abiding members of society,,,168 held that
compelling Amish children to attend school was not essential to the achieve
ment of this goal because the Amish lifestyle also generated the desired
result.

And to the state's argument that the children should be compelled to

attend school in case they eventually rejected the Amish way of life, Burger
similarly responded that he doubted that "Amish children, with their practical
agricilltural training and habits of industry and self-reliance, would become
burdens on society because of educational shortcomings.,,169

Since the

Amish community would provide the children with a form of alternative voca
tiona] education, the Court concluded that the free exercise clause mandated a
religious exemption for the Amish.

The exemption would not undermine the

state's goals, so it was an acceptable, less-restrictive means.
The state, however, countered with the Prince precedent, arguing that
when the issue involved the welfare of children, the doctrine of parens

patriae gave the state broader power than when only adults were involved.
167 ld . at 220
168 ld. at 222
169 ld . at 224

In
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Prince the Court hac! dec']

irH~d

to appl v

60

Lric t scrutinv to a state's appJ ic;t

tion of its child labor law against soLicitation activities of Jehovah's
vJitnesses, though the majority implied that strict scrutinY might have been
the approach applied if only adult conduct had been at issue.

Hm,-('ver, Burger

cited Brennan's rJdssification of Prince in his Sherbert opinion as a case
presenting the regulation of conduct deemed a "substantial threat to public
safety, peace or order."

He concluded that Yoder was not a case

"j n

which any

harm to the physical or mental health of the child or to the public safety,
peace, order, or welfare has heen demonstrated or may be properly
inferred.,,170

Moreover, Burger noted, the parental right to privacy pro

tected by the fourteenth amendment overrode the state's power under parens
patriae since requiring Amish children to attend secondary school might have
led to the eventual extinction of the faith itself.

Therefore, Prince was not

relevant.
The Yoder ruling apparently was qualified in a few important w'ays.

If

the Amish had objected to elementary education, for instance, the case might
have turned out differently, as Burger implied and Justice White noted in a
concurring opinion.

But a different conclusion in such instances did not

undermine the strict scrutiny approach.

The Court could easily conclude that

requiring elementary education was essential to achieve a compelling interest.
In addition, Burger stressed that the children would receive vocational
training in the Amish community, but this emphasis does not contradict a
strict scrutiny approach either.

Burger intended it to show that providing an

exemption would not undermine the state's goals.

Yoder definitivelyestab

lished strict scrutiny as the standard of review for free exercise claims.

170 Id . at 231
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,~ddltional

61

ways.

He spent

1

great ciE'al

of time emphasizing how old and respe(:ted the Amish religion was, and he
(~arefullv

riescribed the outlook and requirements of the faith.

He made clear

t-hat there was no doubt that their objection to seconriarv ('dU(,,'ltion '-':as
.. f j r mLv g r 0 un d e din . . . c en t r air eli g i 0 usc 0 nee p t s " 17 1

faith.

0

f the Am ish

These qualifications, seemed to serve an unspoken purpose.

opinion fully endorsed strict scrutiny in general.
doctrine was unconditional.

Th~

Its support for that

But the opinion also included so many specifi

references to the Amish way of life that its holding was somewhat restricted
to the facts of the case.

Religious objectors of other sects would have to do

more than simply invoke the Yoder precedent to gain an exemption from compul
sory education laws.

Religious sects not as well established as the Amish or

those which did not provide community bonds as strong as those of the Amish
would probably not quali
extended.

for a f r e e ex e r cis e ex em p t ion un 1 e s s 1'0 d e r

\~. e r

The Court was apparently concerned about generating a tide of

"
ne~

claims, reviewing claims made bv adherents to obscure faiths, or faring the
task of ferreting out fraudulent claims.
I~der

Somewhat limiting the holding of

to its specific facts, the Court guarded itself against these hypotheti

cal situations.
Justice Douglas dissented in Yoder for two reasons.

First, he helieved

that the Court should have based its opinion on the desires of the Amish
children to stop attending school rather than on their parents desire to keep
them within the community.

Douglas feared that the parents might force the

children into a lifestyle against their will and, by depriving them of
secondary education, make it difficult for them to abandon that lifestyle.
Douglas also

criticized much of Burger's careful qualifying.

171 Id . at 210

Douglas thought
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record of the Am Ls h . . •

A religion is a r ligion irrespective of what the

misdeme;:lnor or felony records of its members might he. ,,172

Douglas feared

that the Court was narrowing its definition of legitimate H'l i3Lon hv 0mpha
sizing the hi.story and commlln.ity bonds of the Amish.

He riisagrer:d with

Burger's portrayal of the Amish lifestyle as If'idvllic agrarianism, ,,,17:3
taking it as a way of deeming the Amish faith more entitled to free exercise
exemptions than other religions. 174

Douglas wanted the Court to adopt as a

first amendment standard, the broad interpretation of reI

ion in Seeger and

Welsh, which Douglas took to include personal philosophical views.

As noted

above, this broad definition of religion aggravated the potential conflict
between the two religion clauses in the draft exemption cases, but Douglas did
not comment on the possibility of increased clause conflict resulting from
this definition.

Yoder, even with Burger's qualified stance, had illustrated full strict
scrutiny in action.

But two other cases from the same time period, Cruz 'v.

Beta (1972) 175 and Johnson v. Robison (1974)176 showed that the Court
was not going to apply the doctrine to evaluate all instances of free exercise
bllnJens.

172 Id • at 246
173 Id • at n. 5 (quoting lower court judge)

174 In an attempt to show that Amish society was no more perfect than any
other, Douglas noted that adolescent drinking was common and that suicide was
rates among the Amish were equivalent to those of American society in general.
Id.

175 405 U.S. 319
176 415 U.S. 361
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In Cruz, a Buddhist prison inmate alleged that prison offi('i 1s discrim

inated against his religion by denying him opportunities to practice his
reJ

ion.

The lower courts had denied his chaJlenge without a hearing.

The

Court vacated their judgment and remanded the case for further prnceedings to
~letermine

if his rjght to free exercise \vas violated.

comment on the strict scrutiny approach.

The Court did not

But noting the unique conditions of

the prjson environment, the Court suggested that the Constitution required
pr ison adminis tra tors to provide "reasonabl e oppo rtuni ties " for "all pr i son(~r s
to exercise,,177 their religion.

This statement implied that the courts did

not have to apply strict scrutiny to allegations of free exercise burdens in
prisons; they could apply a more lenient standard.
The Court suggested the same for military matters in Robison.

In this

case, an individual who had fulfilled alternative civilian service as a
conscientious objector, challenged Congress' disqualification of conscientious
objectors from receipt of veterans' educational benefits.

The Court rejected

his challenge without even mentioning strict scrutiny, let alone applying it.
Although Justice Brennan, who wrote the opinion of the Court, was very vague
in his free exercise analysis, he seemed only to apply a rational-relationship

test while implying that government's interest was compelling.

He noted that

the burden in this case was far less severe than the one in Gillette, but he
did not evaluate the obviously different justifications for the two dissimilar
hurdens.

Instead, he noted that the aim of the secular, general law providing

the benefits was not to interfere with free exercise, !'because to do so would
not rationally promote the its purposes.,,178

He concluded that "in light

of Gillette, the Government's substantial interest in raising and supporting
177 405 U.S. at 322, n. 2

178Robison, 415 U.S. at 385
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armi s . . . is . . . clearly '':;ilft'icipnt to sllsta.in
.
tlon.
. . . ,,179

the challengeo le01s1a

Despite his suggestion that the government , s interest was

compelling (or "substantial"L Brennan did not apply strict scrutiny.
Court established a much more lenient stanrlard for

evaluatin~

The

free exercise

claims involving any legislation louching on military matters.
Douglas. the lone dissenter, attacked the majority and effectively
pointed out its inconsistency with precedent.

He noted that the law provided

educational benefits to any veteran, regardless of whether he served in
oversees combat or !'lived with his family in a civilian communi tv and worked
from nine to five as a file clerk on a military base . .

,,180

As Douglas

protested, Sherbert, Yoder, and other cases demanded a different result in
this case.

He quite correctly could not conceive of any compelling reason to

draw a line between "conscientious objectors who performed alternative
civilian service and all other draftees.,,181
strikingly similar to those in Sherbert.

The facts in Robison were

Yet in the latter case, the Court

did not simply claim that the denial of unemployment benefits was constitu
tional because it was secular and not aimed at the suppression of religious
exercise.

As the author of Sherbert, Brennan knew that the only relevant

difference between that case and Robison was that the latter intruded into the
military sphere.

Nevertheless, he completed the process in this case that

Marshall had quietly begun in Gillette, cutting an exception in the free
exercise clause for military regulations.

The most incredible feature of

Robison was that only one justice objected to it.

179 Id •
180 Id . at 389

181 Id . at 388-89
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Despi te the Court s re triet 1\

decis LEins in Cruz and Rohison, it

I

continued to endorse free exercise strict scrutiny and resol\'e the douhts
bv Brennan's

Sherbert opinion.

Tn fact,

admission about that Sherbert opinion
major

t

Brennan quietly slippf:I(i a maior

nlo his opininD in t.he Court's next

free e.xer('isf.~ case, l"'fc[)aniel ~. Pat~·

(1<)78).1({2

In this case a

preacher challenged a provision in Tennessee's constitutional con\'ention call
which prohihited ministers from serving as delegates to the convention.

A

plurality of four applied strict scrutiny to strike down the disqualification.
Brennan concurred in the result, believing that the provision infringed
religious belief rather than conduct.

Since religious belief was protected

absolutely, he believed the Court did not have to apply any judicial balancing
test at all, it should just strike down the provision as unjustifiable.

In

his concurring opinion Brennan refuted a lower court, which had relied on

Braunfeld to suggest that the indirect burden on free exercise in McDaniel
constitutional.

W;lS

In the course of this discussion Brennan stated in one

sentence in a footnote that "[clandor compels the acknowledgement that to the
extent that Braunfeld conflicts with Sherbert in this regard, it was over
ruled.,,183

Although this admission was not binding precedent because it

was merely a comment in a concurring opinion, it was not disputed in McDanie.l
by any other justice on the Court.

This minor point Brennan's opinion

supports a view that after Yoder the Court probably considered strict scrutinv
to be firmly established in the free exercise field.

Moreover, the comment

went part of the way toward answering the final question coming out of the

Sherbert opinion:

whether the Court would apply strict scrutiny or the more

182 435 U.S. 618 (striking down Tennessee's policy of disqualifying
ministers from serving as delegates to state constitutional convention)
183 Id • at 633, n. 6
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The indirect burden in ,\lcDaniel resulted from a discriminator\' La"-;.

so the Court's ruling could not remove that point Left open i.n Sherhert. 184
The Court did remove that Itngering doubt Zlbout strict scrlltinv three
years lati~r in Thoma.s

L

Review Board (1981).185

Thi.s case was simil r to

Sherbert in that it involved a denial of 11nemployment compensation to an

individual whose unemployment resulted from his religious practices.

Thomas

was a Jehovah's Witness who quit his job when his company closed the roll
foundry in which he worked and transferred him to a department that produced
tank turrets.

He quit his job because he believed that his reI

ion forbade

him from directly participating in war production and because there were no
open positions in the company that were not directly involved in war produc
tiun.

Indiana denied his request for unemployment, but the Court reversed

their decision.
Thomas differed from Sherbert in several important respects.

First.

Thomas had quit his job because of his religious beliefs, while Sherbert had
been terminated because of hers.

The Court, Chief Justice Burger writing for

an eight-man majority, held this difference to be irrelevant.

Burger reasoned

that
184McDaniel did seem to clear up one minor caveat lingering from the
Sherbert opinion. Brennan had asserted in Sherbert that Braunfeld remained a
valid precedent because the burden in that case was less direct than the one
in Sherbert. The burden in McDaniel, involving no denial of a public,
monetary benefit, might also be considered less direct than the one in
Sherbert. Yet no justice even implied that the Court should compare the
directness of the burden in McDaniel with the directness of the burdens in
Sherbert and Braunfeld to determine whether strict scrutiny or the Braunfeld
standard was applicable. The plurality simply cited Sherbert and Yoder and
applied strict scrutiny, and Brennan conceded that Sherbert had overruled
Braunfeld, at least in part. So McDaniel represented an implicit repudiation
of Brennan's terse statement in Sherbert which was really never anything more
than a flimsy excuse for not overruling Braunfeld in 1963.

185 450 U.S. 707

§ 3.

The Rise of Pree Exercise Strict Scrutiny.
rldad Thomas

sjmpl~;

;)resented hirw-;el f

t

th(~

67

.

1il ~l t t err e r

line but refused to perform any ac.signf'rl v:ork, it must be assumed
that he, like Sherbert, would have heen termi.nated by the emplover's action, if no other work was availahle.

In both cases,

th3 termination flowed from the fact that the emplnvment, once

acceptable, became religiousLy objectionable because of changed
conditions. 186
The Court extended Sherbert to include individuals who quit their jobs because
new conditions rendered their work religiously unacceptable.

Thomas also diverged from Sherbert in another respect.

Abstinence from

Saturday labor was clearly a tenet of the Jehovah's Witness faith.

However,

Thomas and a co-worker in the turret plant, who was also a Jehovah's Witness,
disagreed about whether or not producing tank turrets violated their religion.
The co-worker had no religious objection to his job.

The lower court also

noted that "Thomas was 'struggling' "7ith his beliefs and was not able to
'articulate' his belief precisely.,,187

Because of these problems the lower

court perceived in Thomas' assertions, its suggested that his objection was
probably based more on personal rather than religious belief.

But Burger held

that courts should not "dissect" a claimant's beliefs because he "admits that
he is 'struggling' with his position or because his beliefs are not articulat
ed with the clarity and precision that a more sophisticated person might
employ.,,188

Nor should courts take cognizance of "not uncommon" "[i1ntra

faith differences.,,189
186 1d . at 718
187 1d . at 715
188 1d .
189 1d •

Burger clearly restated the Court's opposition to

~"3o
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Thomas pre

sented the lone situation in which the Court had not clarified frep exercise
doctrine since the Sherbert opinion:
secular, general law.

an indirect burden

resul~ing

from a

Braunfeld required that the Court use a doctrine that

did not include the compelling-interest standard of strict scrutiny.

Without

even mentioning Braunfeld Burger cited Sherbert and Yoder anet appl i,ed strict
scrutiny.

By closing the last caveat in Brennan's Sherbert opinion, the Court

had at last undeniably overruled Braunfeld sub silento. ':)tripping it of
legitimacy it still retained.

lill.'

Except for cases involving prisons or the

militarY, courts were to use strict s rutinv to eV(11uate frep (·'\ercise
ehallenges grounded in reJ igiousLv motivated conduct.
FinaLly, applying strict scrutiny, Burger held that neither of [ndian:l's
asserted interests were sufficiently compelling to justify the infringement of
190 Id . at 715-16 ("One can, of course, imagine an asserted claim SI)
bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in motivation, as not to be entitled t i l
protection under the Free Exercise Clause; but that is not the case here. and
the guarantee of free exercise is not limited to beliefs which are shared hv
all of the members of a religious sect. Particularly in this sensitive area,
it is not within the judicial function and judicial competence to inqllire
whether the petitioner or his fellow worker more correctly perceived the
commands of their common faith. Courts are not arbiters of scriptural
interpretation.")
191 id . at 712 (The compensation statute "'is not intended to facilitate
changing employment or to provide relief for those who quit work voluntarily
for personal reasons. Voluntary unemployment is not compensable under the
purpose of the Act, which is to provide benefits for persons unemployed
through no fault of their own. "') (quoting Indiana Supreme Court)
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It is clear that the Court did not introduce strict scrutiny in the free
exercise field in one feJI swoop.

Components of the doctrine had developed

gradually in free exercise cases since 1940.

The Court fused those components

in 1963 in Sherbert, but in attempting to save a precedent which did not even
haVf~

a majority opLnion, the Court left some questions about the use of (.;;trlct

scrutiny in free exercise cases.
Left by Sherhert.

One by one, the Court dismissed the doubts

The Court strongly endorsed free exercise i->cfutiny in Yoder

in 1972 and c'ompletelv adopted it in 1981.
At the same time, the Court became aware of some problems with applving
strict scrutiny in the free exercise field.

The potential for conflict

between the two religion clauses of the first amendment became palpable for
the Court in the draft-exemption cases (If the early 1970's.

The Court also

contemplated the potential for a flood of claims. some of them fraudulent, in
those cases as well as in Yoder.

Perhaps because of these problems, the Court

moved to isolate cases involving prisons and the military from the reach of
free exercise strict scrutiny.

But by 1981, the Court had really done nothing

about the problems that strict scrutiny could entail.
192 Id . at 719

It denied the serious
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final repuc1iati r Hl of Braunfeld and the full establishment
doctrine,

In Thomas, Justice Rehnquist: announced his opposition to the

doc t r i n e and

I h e sa""
cace
gr't

the Sherheft

it also marked the beginning of the end for free exercise strict

scrutiny.

he mav

Clf

0

u t 1 in e d his pIa n [ () r the r eli g ion cIa 11 S e s . 19'.1..

.
IllS
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f u if'lI
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f ' ld 195 an d
p 1 an more tllan
~l
eri 'In t h e f' ree exerC.Lse.le,

the resul t he sought for the establishment clause jn 19<)2. 196

193 Sherbert f 374 U. S. 398, 413 (Stewart, J., concurr i ng)

194Thomas, 450 U.S. at 720-727. Rehnquist sought to resurrect BraunfeLd
and to overturn the broad interpretation of the establishment clause grounded
in School District v. SchempPf 374 U.S. 203 (1963) and Everson v. Board of
Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
See~ in[ra, § 4.
195 5ee Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 110 S.Ct. 1595

(1990)
196 Lee v. Weisman, 59 U.S.L.W. 2095 (1st Gir. 1990), cert. granted, 59
U.S.L.W. 3635 (U.S. Mar. 18, 1991) (No. 90-1014) (striking down benediction
delivered by clergy at public school graduation ceremony as establishment of
religion)
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In ,A-fcDaniel (1978),197 a plural itv of justices noted their approval
of a lower court's application of strict scrutiny to decide a free exercise
challenge to a state law criminalizing the sacramental use of pevote. 198
Although they did not necessarily endorse the result of that court application
of the docLI"ine, they did cite it approvingly as the correct approach to free
exercise adjudication. 199

That plurality consisted of Chief Justice Burger

and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens.
Stewart,

~arshall,

Four other justices--Brennan,

and Blackmun--did not join the plurality's opinion, but

~s

pre\ious and subsequent cases showed, these four strongly supported free
,
' t ,scrlltl'n .".200
exerC1se
st
_rIC,
r
U

Only Justice White was reluctant to endorse

197 435 U.S. 618

198The case was People v. Woody, 61 Cal.2d 716, 40 Cal.Rptr. 69, 394
P.2d 813 (1964)
199 435 U.S. at 628, n. 8 ("[TJhe courts have . . . precluded the
application of criminal sanctions to the religious use of peyote, People v.
Woody, . . . or the religiously impelled refusal to comply with mandatory
education laws past the eighth grade, Wisconsin v. Yoder. We need not pass on
the concl usions reached in . . . Wood}', which [was] not revielved by this
Court. Those cases are illustrative of the general nature of free exercise
protections and the delicate balancing required by our decisions in Sherbert
and . . . Yoder, when an important state interest is shown.")

200Brennan and Stewart had first endorsed the doctrine in dissenting
opinions in Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 610-16 (1961) (dissenting
opinions), and each had continued to support it. See, e,g., Thomas v. Review
Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981), Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), and
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). Justices Marshall and Blackmun had
also joined the majority in Yoder and continued to support strict scrutiny.
See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 1615-23
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A more important factor Ln the doctrinal.

shift was the conversion of several justices from a pro-exemption to hnd antiexemption position. 2 0 3

The potential difficulties with strict scrllt nv

also became more apparent as the Court faced challenges to tax laVe's, internal
governmental policies, and federal lanJ-use decisions.
19S0's are vieKed t().~ether, the gradual

obvious.

(::[OS10n
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the casps of the

of strict scrutiny

he(~omeq

And that erosion began with Rehnquist's dissent in Thomas.

(1990) (Black:nun, .1., dissenting).

:2 [) 1\I!h i t e j 0 in e cl Jus t ice Ha r 1 an ! s dis sent in Sherbert \/. lie r n e r , ) 7 1+ C. S .
J93, 1{18-23 (1063) but supported strict scrutiny in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 237-41 (1972) (White, J., concurring). He did not believe there was
a f r e e ex ere i s e vi 0 1 at ion i n Me Da n j e 1, t+ 15 e. S. at 643 - 46 ( Wh i t e t J., can cur
ring) (\\1hi te based his conclusion on equal protection).
And during the 1980' ~
he supported strict scrutiny in free exercise cases involving unemployment
compensation, see Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec .• 489 U.S. 820
(1989), Hobbie v. Unemployment Appea.ls Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987), and Thomas
v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981), but not in some other free exercise
cas s. See, e.g., Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. ~'. Smith, 110 S.Ct.
1595 (1990') and L:vng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 u.s.
660 (1988).

202Stewart in 1981 (by O'Connor); Burger in 1986 (by the elevation of
Rehnquist, whose associate justice seat was filled by Scalia); and Powell in
1987 (by Kennedy, who did not take his seat until early 1988 because the
Senate rejected Reagan's first choice for the seat, D.C. Appeals Court Judge
Robert H. Bark, see R. Bork, The Tempting of America, 267-55 (19901).

203 E . g , Rehnquist, Stevens, Burger, and Powell.
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for free exercise strict scrutiny was unclear, he had not commented

disapprovingl v of it in any opinion.

But

n Thomas. 205 Rehnquist broke with the majori~ty and announced his

opposition to the application of strict scrutiny in this case.

He criticized

the majority for failing to adequately address the "tension, " as the majority
put it, 206 which he believed had three causes.

Two of his asserted causes,

the application of the first amendment through the fourteenth to state (as
opposed to onlY federal) activities and the growth of social welfare legisla
lion, were not trulY causes for the conflict, though they did increase the
opportunities for its occurrence.

Rehnquist's third cause, which reallv vas

the source of the problem, was the Court's interpretation of the clauses:

"Bv

broadlv construing both Clauses, the Court has consistently narrowed the
channel between the Scylla and Charybdis through which any state or federal
action must pass in order to survive constitutional scrutinv.,,207

His

solution was to restrict the interpretations of both clauses.

204 406 U.S. 205 (1971)
205 450 U.S. 707, 720-27 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
206 450 U.S. at 719 ("There is, in a sense, a 'benefit' to Thomas
deriving from his religious beliefs, but this manifests no more than the
tension between the two Religion Clauses which the Court resolved in Sherbert .

.")

207 fd. at 721.
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But this position "'-as not the Bral1nfeld doctrine.

That

required government to fulfill the least-restrictive-means require

ment as well as the general-applicability and secular-purpose standards.
\lthough Rehnquist would be satisfied with Braunfeld, he really wanted to push
free exercise jurisprudence back to its status prior even to Cantr-..-e.ll v.
Connecticut (1940).209

And that is precisely what the Court ultimately did

in Smith IT (1990).210

He Hould also radically restrict the scope of the

establishment clause. 211
His criticism of the Court's weak attempt to address the issue of clallSC
conflict was effective.
compjleri its

In Lemon v. Kurtzman (1973),212 the Court had
') 1 '3

.

stabl ishment cl ause requirements from previous cases-·· into

208Td . at 723

209 310 U.S. 296
21°110 S.Ct. 1595
211 He believed the establishment clause should be interpreted only to
prevent government from "'throwing the weight of secular authorit[ies] behind
the dissemination of religious tenets." Thomas, 450 U.S. at 726 (quoting
McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 248 [19481 [Reed, J., dissent
ing1). This reinterpretation would not be pushing back establishment clause
doctrine, for the Court had never interpreted that clause so narrowly. See
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947)
212 403 U.S. 602
213These cases included Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) and
School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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lccl<oe.

exer"ls
ThE'

But e\:en if the. rE:'f' {"=cr(~ise exemption

majr)ri

e,,-efriptic:n for Thom.iS
t,'

el.>!')

\'.101atcd Uw

incd to av,l

((·'[[ns

()

+:he

r.he Lemon

test, '-'lhich the Court never admitted, it \·muld not necessari
Rehnquist's soLution to the clause conflict, radically cut hack the scope of
both clauses, went

~ell

beyond what was necessary to cure the problem.

The

conflict could be resul\'ed either bv eliminating free exercise exemptions
alone or bv loosening the strict rules of the Lemon test to permit some
governmental accommodation of religion.

However, easing the conflict did not

require either clause to be stripped down to the degree Rehnquist desired.
And any solution only needed to modify one of the clauses, not both. 215
Rehnquist's failure to mention the availability of narrower solutions to the
problem of clause conflict suggested that he was driven by ideological
considerations more than true concern about the problem at Issue.

In other

words, clause conflict was a screen for an agenda designed to drasticallv
roll-back the protections provided by both of the religion clauses.

Recogniz

ing Rehnquist's motivations, however, does not eliminate the existence of real
conflict between the clauses that the Court refused to adequately address.
An additional decline in support for free exercise strict scrutiny had
been possible in 1981, as Justice Stewart, a strong supporter of the doctrine.

214 To pass establishment clause scrutiny legislation first had "have a
secular purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion . . . ; finally, the statute must not
foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion. '" Lemon, 403 at
612-13 (1971) (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. 664 [1970]).
215 See P. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29
U.ehi.L.Rev. 1 (1962)
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retired from the Court.

Ho\·.ever,

Rt'al~,ln":-:

76

r placement for Slet..;art:, j'lsticE'.

O'Connor, eventually proved to support strict scrutinv in the free

exer~i

0

field almost as strongly as Ste~art had. 216

In the following year, however. support for fret' exercise strict
scrutin\- dill e['ode turther.
case involving the Amish.

United State';

L

Lee (1982)":'"17 was .lnother
!

Although the Court had granted them a

lin~it:ed

exemption from compulsory education laws in Yoder218 a decadE' earlier, th.:::
Court was hostile to their request in Lee for a free
the payment of social security- paYToll taxes.

e~ercise

exemption from

In factJ the Court strained its
~ost

analysis in the case to avoid granting the exemption.

importantly,

Justice St.evens, "'iho had joined both the plurality in HcDaniel and the
majority in Thomas, defected to the Rehnquist camp.

He endorsed Rehnquist's

position in an opinion concurring in the result in Lee.
The Amish challengers in Lee objected to participation in the social.
security system because their religious beliefs prohibited it.

They noted

that Congress had statutorily provided for the exemption of self-emploved
nlemhers of the Amish faith but had not extended the statutory exemption to
Amish employers and employees generally.

Burger, writing for the majority,

(tid not extend the exemption judicially either.

He applied strict scrutiny,

but, as Stevens noted in dissent, Burger manipulated the governmental inter
ests to avoid granting the exemption.

There really was no compelling reason

not to grant it.

216 See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 110 S.Ct. 1595,
1606-15 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring in result) and Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S.
693, 724-34 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting).
217 455 U.S. 252
218 406 U.S. 205 (1972)
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Bur g e r c 1. ted Bra un f e 1 d s e' .era 1 tim e s \, i.l h 0 U t qua 1 i fie <..d~

IH},

h 'l ~~

;j

t:

t tl e

same time he restated the terms of strict scrutiny and nominally ;lPP .icd
doctrine, not noting any contradiction.
rut i n v

s
II ~

~'l a sin e p t.

\!oreover, hi

appllcatjon of s:rict

His f.i r s teo n c .l U S Lon \';' a s t hat t hi ~ go \ e :::- tl men t had

1

,

,11

"a comprr.:=:hensive national social securi t\· svstem providing for \:olunLlfY

participation wouLd be almost a contradiction in terms and tllfficuit, if not
,
'1 1 e, to almlnlstcr.
1 ..
,,')')0
ImpOSS1)
w ....

c:ompel I

So he apparent.l

found that government had

reason not to make the system voluntary.

But that concl'lsion was

fai rly irn·;levant to this case because the Amish had not asl;:ed the Court to

make the system voluntary; they had merely requested a narrow religious
exemption.

Strict scrutiny required that the over-arching goal. providing for

the welfare of retired workers, had to be compelling, which it obviously was,
and that government had to present some compelling reason for denying a
t't,1 i.giOllS exemption to the Amish ehallengers.

Burger suggested that !lit would

t,P difficult to accommodate the comprehensive social security system with
. 1 exceptIons·
.
f low1ng
.
f rom a
myrlac
~as

WI. d e

.
varIety

0 fl
re"19louS

b.e l'Ie f s. " -_.
~) ? 1

attempting to invoke the Court's fear of a flood of claims.

But even

He
~ith

the great religious diversity of the United States, Burger identified only two
sects whose religious tenets the tax might violate, the Amish and members of
the Sai Baba faith. 222

The Amish had only qualified for the statutory

exemption because they were members of "a religious community having its own

219 Id . at 259
220 Id. at 258
221 Id . at 260-61
222 Id. at 257, n. 6. (citing Henson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 835 (1976»)
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, we 1"tare

system. ,,?__') J)

Since Sai Baba did

TIClt

provide

78

its

OHrl

tern, a lower court had held that its members .tid not quaIl

for the s tat:1 ~orv

ex.emption.
Cnder strict scrutiny, faithfuJ
the exemption.

A~

~,'

applied,

Bur;~('r

shCl'llcl hel\Z' p,ra ted

Stevens pointed out in his concurrence, Congress had

a1 ready exempted self-employed Amish v-lith no alleged negative impact on the
social security system.

He also noted that exempting the Amish would mean not

only that they woul(t not have to pay the tax but also that they "loulct forego
Lhe receipt of any benefits.

The latter, Stevens suggested, would more than

offset the former.

since the Amish were members of a religious

~oreover,

community which maintained its own type of welfare system, government's
interest in comprehensive coverage would not be undermined to any greater
degree than the state's interest in education was subverted by the exemption
for the Amish in Yoder.

But instead of applying this line of reasoning, Burger actually grounded
his decision in considerations which were not presented in the case.

He

argueci that there was no way to distinguish the claim in Lee from a request
for a religious exemption from the payment of income taxes.

The Court Has

clear]y not willing to entertain countless challenges to the income tax system
hy

conntless religious adherents presenting an array of objections.

again, this consideration was irrelevant to the decision in Lee.
adherents had not challenged the income tax.
in his concurrence, their claim could easi
against the social security tax.
specific program, social security.

But

The Amish

Even if they did, Stevens noted
be distinguished from the claim

The latter tax was designed to fund a
Since the Amish had a local system which

fulfilled the same interest that government sought to achieve with social
223 Id. at 261
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~ecurity,

79

they coulJ be exempted from par'ticipation in the entire prcgr'am.

However, the income tax was quite different.

Stevens pointed out that "in the

typical case the taxpayer is not in anv posi tion to suppJ

\r

the government \..Ji th
,).) I

an equivalent substitute for the objectionable use of his monev." . . . '-y

And

since the tederal lmdget contained so manv different elements, r;ortions of it
would probably conflict with the reI
of people.

ious principles of hundreds of thousands

Government could argue that granting far-reaching reI

ious

objections from the income tax would utterly cripple its ability to achieve
any of its legitimate and compelling goals.
surely be deemed a compelling interest.

That real possibility would

Burger's resolution of the social

security issue on the basis of his actual deciding of the income-tax issue was
a clear evasion of the real strict scrutiny considerations in Lee. Stevens was
right in this respect.
However, Stevens would not have reached the conclusion that he suggested
the Court shoilld have reached under strict scrutiny.

He used his concurring

opinion to announce his opposition to the doctrine in the free exercise field.
He believed that the Court's precedents more realistically required the Court
to apply "a standard that places an almost insurmountable burden on any
individual who [on free exercise grounds] objects to a valid
of general applicability.,,225

and neutral la¥!

Besides Gillette, which was actually been

based on a nominal yet lenient application of strict scrutiny similar to that
one in Lee, he relied on no case decided after Sherbert to support his
argument.

Nor did he mention Cantwell, Barnette, Murdock, or Gobitis.

But

cases that figured prominently in Stevens' list of citations were Braunfeld,
the plurality decision which the acceptance of strict scrutiny had implicitly

224 Id . at 262, n.
225 Id . at 263, n. 3

(Stevens, J., concurring in result)
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tl,i~\en

adul ts and minors that

Slu"'r/1f',rt

and

;'o(/e['

had substantial1\'

and ReFnolds (1879),:227 an archai(~, v rtu;.d]v inc!.

vrecedent than did strict scrutiny.
did conflict with Sherbert,

Yoder~

He

80

iph~rah1c orinion that

admitted that the approach

and Thomas.

t:nderc~.lt;

h,,~

r-~spouc;erl

But he argued. that in Light of

Lee, the Court's decision i.n Yoder, v,'hich involved a similar claim, shouJd he

considered an anomaly.
distinguished.

He also suggested that Sherbert and Yoder ('Quld be

At any rate, he preferred his lenient doctrine 228 because

he believed it would "keep[] the government . . . out of the husiness of
evaluating the relative merits of differing religious claims.

The risk that

governmental approval of some and disapproval of others will be perceived as
favor·jng one religion over another is an important risk the Establi hment
Clause t-;as designed to preclude.,,229
vateJ, as Rehnquist

It seemed that Stevens was not moti

by ideological considerations.

~as,

tions would he seen as religious discrimination.

Stevens feared exemp

He supported a strict view

of neutrality that would maintain the strict Lemon test for establishment

clause cases while scaling back the free exercise clause to lessen the clause confll

226 321

u.s.

158

227 98 u.S. 145
228 1t was actually Rehnquist's lenient doctrine.

at 720-27 (Rehnquist, J.

t

See Thomas, 450 U.S.

dissenting)

229 Id . at n. 2.
230 See P. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29
U.Chi.L.Rev. 1 (1962) (advocating rigorous establishment clause standards
combined with elimination of free exercise exemptions to achieve governmental
neutrality toward religion)
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scrutiny in Thomas, joined the majoritv in Lee.

Apparentl v he had

prnhlem

T10

joining an opinion that at: led.st nomjnalh- sanc:tioned strirt scrutinv ifit

reached the result he sought with his anti exemptions free exerris
nne mit h;:1.\ f:
Ohfl

e'\ pee

ted hIm to

j

0

inS t eve n SIC 0 riC': u r r e n(' e

0

rlortrine.

r f i J eon (' () f his

tersely referring readers to his Thomas dissent.
For several years after 1982, the Court did not decide any cases

significant to the development of strict scrutiny in the free exercise field.
The Court did apply the doctrine in Bob Jones University
r)

(1983),~

31

\l.

United States

concluding that government's interest in eradicating racial

discrimination in private education was sufficiently compelling to justify a
revocation of tax-exempt status for private, religious schools, even though
tlleir racially discriminatory policies were based on sincere religious
beliefs.

Rehnquist dissented, but he disputed a statutory interpretation nf

the majority rather than their application of strict scrutiny.
The Court also decided Susan and Tony Alamo Foundation v. Sec.
(1985).232

f)f

Labor

In this case the Court held that religious followers who harked

for a religious enterprise and received room and board but no wages were
"employees" for the purposes of federal minimum-wage and maximum-hour requ ire
ments because their services were economic.

The foundation claimed that

applying the labor requirements to the foundation would violate the free
exercise rights of the followers, who believed their religion forbade them
from accepting wages from the enterprise.

The Court unanimously held that no

free exercise analysis was necessary since the labor regulations, if applied
to the foundation, would not require any significant change in the found
231 461 U.S. 574
232 471 U.S. 290
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f the labor standards.

Through 1985, support for free exercise strict sCf11tin,)'
ahly

shift,~d

since the Court handed dot-m Lee.

~la(t

not nntice

Six justices--Burger, Brennan,

Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and O'Connor--presumably still endorsed the
doctrine.

Although not objecting to the application of the doctrine in Bob

Jones University-, in ",-hleh the Court had not granted an exemption, Rehnquist

and Stevens definitely opposed strict scrutiny and had endorsed a no-exemp
tions alternative. 233

And Justice White's position remained unclear.

He

had not explicitly objected to strict scrutiny itself since he joined Harlan's
dissent in Sherbert in 1963.
the doctrine since 1981.

And he had joined in the Court's applications of

Nevertheless, he had expressed extreme caution when

he joined the Court's opinion in Yoder in 1972.

And he had found no infringe

ment of free exercise in McDaniel in 1978, when he based his opinion on equal
protection.

His support for strict scrutiny in the free exercise field did

not seem totally reliable.

So strict scrutiny still commanded a six- or

seven-person majority by the end of 1985.
However, that margin slipped significantly in Bowen v. Roy (1986).234
Two more justices--Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell--endorsed the noexemptions, strict-neutrality position for at least some types of free
233The free exercise considerations in Bob Jones University were not a
prominent feature of that case. The judicial disagreement centered on whether
or not the IRS had statutory authority to promulgate a policy tying tax-exempt
status to considerations of racial discrimination. As a result, the actions
of Stevens, who joined the majority opinion, and Rehnquist, whose dissent was
silence on the matter of strict scrutiny, should not be taken to suggest that
they had changed their positions on the free exercise doctrine.

234 476 U.S. 693

§

{t-o

The Erosion of Free Exercise Strict Scrutiny.

rr l'-ie
some~hat

hurciens.

And thl::'

C(lurt

pro\'irled ::t major clarif c'ltjnn ;,f ,"ihcrhert.

limiting its reach.

Tn Hoy taNat l v e Am e ric an par (\ n t (: t-, all en?; edt h E'

P,

nv e r nm en tIs r e qui reIn en t

that he supplv a social securitv number for his daughter in
food stamps and other public assistance.

He also ohjected to

t:se nf any social security number which he might supply or

ment might simply assign to his daughter.

()rd{~r

to r0ceive

th~' gO\ernfllent''1

~"hich

HLS religious beliefs

the

gov(~rn

suggf~sted

that because the social security number was a unique identifier representing
his daughter, use of the number would '''rob [her] spirit",235 and restrict
her "spiritual power.,,236

The lower court learned during the trial that

the government had already assigned his daughter, named Little Bird of the
Snow, a social security number.

The government then contended that the case

was moot because the damage to her spirit had already occurred, but Roy argued
that it was the actual use of the number, not merely the assignment, which
would be detrimental to his daughter's spiritual development.

The lower

courtt finding no compelling reason to deny Roy an exemption from the ntlmber
requirement, ordered the government not to use the number assigned to LittLe
Bird of the Snow and barred the government from denying public assistance to
Roy because of his refusal to supply a social security number.

The government

appealed the lower court's injunction.
Eight justices agreed that the first part of the court's order, forbid
ding the government from using the already-assigned number, should be over
turned.

A portion of Burger's opinion announced the decision of the Court in

this matter.

The reasoning constituted a slight revision of the scope of free

exercise strict scrutiny.

Burger cited Douglas concurring opinion in Sherbert

235 Id . at 698 (quoting Roy)
236 Id.

~
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\-,hat the government cannot do to the indiyiriuai. not in terms oE what the

i fldividual can extract from the ;?,overnment.

I II ')

-

37

Upon this rat ionaJ e, the

Court concluded that
rtlhe free E:..:::ercise Clause simply cannot be unde'rslood to require

the Government to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that
comport with the religious beliefs of particular citizens.

Just

as the Government may not insist that [Roy] engage in any set form
of religious observance, so [Roy1 may not demand that the Govern
ment join in [his] chosen religious practices.

Rov may no

more prevail on his religious objection to the Government's use of
a Social Securitv number for his daughter than he could on a
sincere religious objection to the size or color of the Govern
ment's filing cabinets.,,238
Use of the assigned social security number was an internal affair. so the free
exercise clause did not prevent government from using the number which it had
already assigned to Little Bird of the Snow.
But applying Douglas' concurrence to get this result was a bit of a
sleight-of-hand maneuver.

Douglas had not drawn a distinction between

internal and external affairs of government.

His point in his concurrence was

simply that the free exercise clause did not require the government to
subsidize Sherbert's Saturday abstinence from labor.

It only required a

religious exemption for Sabbatarians from the disqualification provisions of
unemployment compensation legislation which government might or might not
choose to enact.

He was actually trying to deal with Stewart's assertion in

237 Id • at 700 (quoting 374
238 Id . at 700

u.s.

398, 412)
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Douglas' statement to modify Sherbert slightly.

ThE' Court simp! v llsed

No opinion in that case (or

in any subsequent case) suggested the existence of any internal affairs
exception to the scope of the free exercise clause.
in Roy perhaps to avoid having to grant an exemption.

The Court fabricated it
The lower court had

held that exempting Roy from the number requirement would create some adminis
trative difficulties but that they would not constitute a compelling reason
for denying the exemption.

A majority of the justices might have had a hard

time disputing that conclusion.

And without modifying free exercise doctrine

the waY they did, their only alternative to granting the exemption would be
handing down another Lee opinion.
With the primary issue settled, the Court still had to contend with the
other part of the lower court injunction. which prevented the government from
denying Roy public assistance because of a refusal to supply a number himself.
Even though the government had already assigned Little Bird of the Snow a
number and could use it, there was some question as to whether the government
might still require Roy to supply it with a number for his daughter before
granting public assistance.

The Court majority disintegrated over this isslle.

Three justices believed the government could deny benefits if Roy refused to
supply a number.
the question.

Three believed that it could not.

Two would not consider

And White simply noted that Sherbert and Thomas controlled this

239 See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 463-75 (1971) and
Johnson v. Robison, 415 u.s. 361, 386-90 (1974)
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and dissented:
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matter.

Pm,} ella n d Rr~

represented an attempt to compromise on frpi'>

e'~f'r('i';(~

iurisrrudenc'"

In-

retaining strict scrutinv In some cases '-v'hile appl\'ing a pre-('antr"ell:!~'O

doctrine in cases similar to Braunfelrl (1961).

[n

Braunfeld, it l",ill be

recalled. a plurality of the Court declined to apply strict scrutinv to
evaluate a free exercise claim resulting from an indirect burden arising from
a generally applicable, secular regulation:

the Sunday Clnsing Law.

Although

the Braunfeld plurality did apply Cantwell's least-restrictive-means require
ment, they did not invoke the compelling-interest standard which was the heart
·
o f strIct

.

?41

scrutIny.~

Burger pointed out that the burden in Roy Has also

indirect and non-discriminatory, hut he did not suggest that the Court should
apply the Braunfeld test in such cases.

Burger wanted to apply only a

rational-basis version of strict neutrality.

If the legislation hart a secular

purpose and if it was generally applicable, then it did not violate free
exercise if it "is a reasonable means of promoting a legitimate public
"
,,242
lnterest.

Burger did not include even the least-restrictive-means

standard of Cantwell and Braunfeld.

He

did imply, however, that if legisl.a

tion burdened free exercise directly or was discriminatory, it should be
evaluated under strict scrutiny.

Burger simply held that government could

deny benefits if Roy refused to supply a new social security number because
the number requirement "promotes a legitimate and important public interest

240 See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)
241See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961)
242 Id . at 708
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t.he free exercise cl'.luse did not apply to its actions, and Hamilton preceded
the Court's incorporation of the free exercise clause into the meaning of the
fourteenth amendment as a restriction on state actions.

The Court evaluated

the students' claim under a very generalized notion that the fourteenth
amendmf'nt protected against state tnfringement "the right to ('ntertain
[ reI
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Hamilton did not even suggest that thp

L)urteenth amendment protections included the secular-purpose or general
;:tpplicabi.lity standards.

A reliance on Ham.ilton Has also troublesome because

that case was based on a distinction between rights and privileges.

While the

Court admitted that the students possessed at least some type of right to
religious liberty, it held that such a right was irrelevant because the
----~-

243 Id . at 709

244 rd. at 710
245 293 U.S. 245
246 293 U.S. at 262
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eltsappl ied more recent cases \·:hich sU;:J,i':ested that: strict

<..;('rutin\' dPpl ierl t-o all free exercise burdens.
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\nv cases,

ike fader or Lee,

the Co u r t r 0. \' i e h e d d ire c t bur den son f r e e ex ere i, s e, B11 r g e r dis miss (' rl

inappJ icable to Ror despite language in those decision that did not limi.t

the scope of strict scrutiny only to instances of direct burdens.

In addi

tion, he tried to distinguish Sherbert and Thomas by arguing that free
exercise was violated in those cases because the states had

provid~d.

individu

alized systems of review in their unemployment compensation statutes

bllt h~d

not granted rei

Burger

ious exemptions in those administrative processes.

('iaimecl that the Court applied. strict scrutiny because the refusals to
accommodate reI igious beliefs administratively suggested IIdiscriminatory
Ln ten t . ,,2!t8

Brennan had sugges ted that the s t a tu te in Sherber t migh t be

rliscriminatory, but his formulation of strict scrutiny had not relied on that
showing.

And in Thomas, the state did not exempt any personal reasons for

unemployment. religious or otherwise, from the disqualification provision in
its compensation statute.

The Court had simply not

~rawn

a distinction

247 374 U.S. at 404 (HIt is too late in the day to doubt that the liber
ties of religion and expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing
of conditions upon a benefit or privilege."). See also n. 6 (collecting
cases). Even the plurality in Braunfeld had not drawn that distinction.
Chief Justice Warren had required government to apply the least-restrictive
means even though operating a business was a privilege. Braunfeld v. Brown,

366 U.S. 599. 607 (1961).
248 Roy , 476 U.S. at 708
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Burger apparently was attempting to rewrite free exercise doctrine in
Rov.

Perhaps, he

~Yas

attempting to strike a compromise

bet~.;een

Stevens no-exemption position and the Brennan pro-exemptions

the Rehnquist-

vie~.

After all,

Bllrger seemed to suggest that strict scrutiny and exemptions were acceptable
\...:hctl free exercise
frnm di

~.;as

rimination,

burdened directlv or when indirect burdens resulted
He apparently would only apply his hightv deferent ial,

str ct-neutralitv standard when indirect burdens resulted from

non-discrimin~-

249Burger himself had even ~Titten the Yoder opinion, in which he
asset'ted that "[tlhe essence of all that has been said and written on the
subject is that only those interests of the highest order and those not
otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of
religion." 406 U.s. at 215. In other words, the Court had to apply strict
scrutiny when free exercise was burdened. He also wrote that uEal regulation
neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the constitu
tional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free
exercise of religion." 406 U.s. at 220. He dismissed the notion that
legislation had to be discriminatory to violate free exercise. This passage
taken with the other one does not support his new-found proposition that
direct and indirect burdens merited different standards of review. He did not
qualify his language in the first passage by adding "unless the legitimate
burden in only indirect.1t And the "unduly burdens" reference is not equiva
lent to "directly burdens." The term "unduly" can more safely be taken to
mean, as it did in Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 304, that burdens on free exercise
were invalid if government could have applied legislative means which were
less restrictive. The language in every case since at least Sherbert cuts
against Burger's proposition.
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the pro-exemptions assumption that: the democratic process was structurally
Lilted toward mainstream religions.
0'Con:10r, joined by Brennan and Marshall, attacked Burger's plurality
opinion.

She asserted that the test Burger proposed

has no basis in precedent and relegates a serious First Amendment
value to tlle barest level of minimal scrutiny that the Equal
Protection Clause already provides.

. . . Government must accom

modate a legitimate free exercise claim unless pursuing an espe

') s 1

clally important interest bv narrowly tailored means.-

She specifically criticized Burger's reliance on Hamilton and Boh Jones
Cnll.'ersity.

And in the process she decided the case

differentlv~

providing

one of the clearest articulations of the strict scrutiny doctrine of any
opinion since Sherbert.

She pointed out that under strict scrutiny government

had to show both a compelling interest and what she called a "constitutional
interest.,,252

She believed that the governmental interest in preventing

250 Id • at 712.
251 476 U.S. at 727 (concurring and dissenting opinion)

252 Id . at 730 (emphasis omitted)
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This last requirement

Has what

slw meant by a "constitutional" interest.

GO\-t?'-ntnl.'.nt had to show that its overriding purpose was compelling but also
th(~,t:

it had a cumpelling reason for den,)ling a rel

thaI

in

Rov's

iOllS

exemptinn.

She held

case, government could not present the latter, restating the

vie ~v t bat ad min i s t rat i v e inc 0 n v e n i en c e g en e r a1 J. y did not r i set 0 the Le "I=>}

compelling interest. 254

She would have upheld the part of the Lo~er

court's order forbidding government from ILenving benefits hecause Rov mi
a~ain

refuse to provide a numher.

use of a number

~ere

:) ~

t

In other words, government's assign ng rn1

internal affairs that did not violate Roy's free

e~ercise

rights, but government could not constitutionally compel Rov to supply a
number for his daughter himself.

Finally, Blackmun and Stevens would not consider the second question in
the case because they believed its was either moot or not ripe for adjudica

tion.

They had no reason to believe that the government, since it already had
253 Id . at 732

/
25 +Id . at 730-31 (Burger "appears to believe that the added inconve
nience to the State of administering a selective exemption overbalances any
burden on individual religious exercise. But this Court has held that
administrative inconvenience is not alone sufficient to justify a burden on
free exercise unless it creates problems of substantial magnitude.")
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n Lee.
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lTlodifLcatjon, but he did r('state his helief 256 that SIf'Thert

uuld be distinguished from other eases

involving indir0ct ')'lr:!ens.

r h:\d r Lied on a version of the 'jame pr'oJ)()5ition in his plurality

opinion.

In response, Blackmun noted that he r

ected Stc\ens' "narrov/ vi.e'h'

of Sherhert and Thomas. ,,257
By 1996, free exercise strict scrutinv faced serious opposition on the

Court.

TI.'lojustjces, Rehnquist and Stevens, had announced complete opposition

to the (l(J('1 r i ne.

Two more, Burger :lnd Pm'lel L. \.{anted to 1 tmi t

in which it would be dpplied.

lJecame

d

S\v'

he ins ta:'Y',"s

Four still supported the doctrine.

ng \ote in free exercise cases.

So

~h1te

In Ro,'v he had not joined. eif:-:er

he Burger opinion scaling back strjct scrutiny or the O'Connor opinion
strongly endorsing it.

It 'h'as not clear "lhat White's motives \-1ere.

In fact,

another 1986 case showed that he was not an avid supporter of strict scrutiny.
\t the same time that some members of the Court were trying to limit
trict scrutiny in Roy, they explicitly restricted the scope of free exercise

255With Blackmun's endorsement and White's simple reliance on Sherbert
and Thomas, O'Connor was able to note in her opinion that a majority of the
Court in Roy believed that Sherbert and Thomas mandated the answer to the
second inquiry. 476 U.s. at 731.
256He had first articulated the position in his dissent in Lee.
257 Id . at 716, n. 2.
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1986, the Court ruled jn

"mother case involving rrdlitary matters, Goldman L

k'einberger. 260

And tlle

Court left no doubt that strict scrutiny did not apply in Cdses relating to
the military.
In this case an orthodox Jew, who was serving in the Air Force as a
psychologist, sought a free exercise exemption from the military dress code
Hhich forbade him from Hcaring a varmuU\e.

The Air Force's ruLe permi ttf;d

religious adherents to wear religious items that were covered by the reguldr
uniform, a ctass of items that did not include a yarmulke.
nf:vp.rthel{~ss,

\~-orn

But Goldman

a yarmulke for several vears v.;hile nn dutvin

hLS .!!lb ;;d

military hospital, and it had caused no problems.
A fiv'e-person majority, consisting of Burger, \\'hite. Powell,

Hehnqui'~t,

and Stevens, refused to exempt him from the regulation so that he could \·;'ear

yarmulke.

Rehnquist, writing for the majority, !f:asoned that the Court "must

give great deference to the professional judgment of military authorities
concerning the relative importance of a military interest.,,261

258 401 U.S. 437
')r::9

_.) 415 U.S. 361 (1974)

26°475 U.S. 503
261 Id. at 507

Rehnquist

.'1

~

I~.

Th(~

Erosion of

Fr(~c

Exercise Strict: Scrutiny.

that t1'1I' mil it.ify'S ir 1 tf't'(,<'0t:

In

r:1ainL-tinin,o,

ing individualitv justified the regulation,
suggested that the interest ,-,°as compel} ing.

;llth()u;~h

uniY(lrmit~/

and min :ni,'

Rehnqulst in no Kav

He did :I'Jt applv strict

('rutin)'.

HI" contended that the Court had to bf:' "far more d·:,fi.~rf'ntial!' h) m l.i:ar',
1(>:~111atio[Js

chall nged on first amendment grounds thail to (:j·il . n st

because "[tlhe military need not encourage debate ur tol
.

.

.

.

.

.

[ut()s.

ate protest: to the
,,76?

extent that such tolerance 1S requIred of the clv1l1an state. - -

The

requirement: of uniform appearance he.1ped the military to "foster instinctiv
ohedi :lee, unity, commitment. and e':)prit de corps,,263 by suhverting indi
vidual differences among soldiers.

Rehnquist concluded that the visibility

requirement "reasonably and evenhandedly regulate[d] dress in the interest of
the mjlitary's perceived need for uniformity. 11264

Rehnquist had not artic

ulated a precise judicial test to apply when soldiers challenged military
rul

f'S

under the free exercise clause.

But he seemed to suggest that as long

as a rule has generally applicable and reasonably related to some goal that
~'i1S

legitimate "in the professional judgment of military' authorities" it v:as

not unconsi.tutional.
Brennan and O'Connor filed biting dissents criticizing the majorLty.
Brennan accused Rehnquist of applying a "subrat i onal-bas i s standard" with
"absolute, uncritical deference,,265 to military authorities "by eliminat
ing, in all but name only, judicial review of military regulations that
in Lerf ere wi th fundamental const i tutional rights of service personnel. ,,266
262 Id.
263 Id .
264 Id. at 510
265 Id . at 515 (dissenting opinion)
266 Id .
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9)

he 5implv
that there was no reason to

~pplv

aT5~1Ii>d

.
')67
a standard other than strict scrutlnv.-

Brennan also suggested that strict scrutiny ShOllld be applied, but he asserted
that the Air Force had not even met a minimal starldard of credibilitv. 168
Noting thdt military regulations did not r('-'quire complete unitormitv

;in\'~~av.

Brennan believed the Air force couJd permit visible religious garments, like
yarmulkes, as long as they were "consistent with a polished, professional
.
m!'1 ltary
appearance. 11')69
~

Neither Stevens, who filed a concurring opinion, nor Blackmun, who also
dissented, liked Brennan's standard.

Stevens feared that Brennan's test would

encourage military authorities to draw distinctions between religious adher
ents based on more than just the appearance of the item they sought to
wear. 270

Blackmun also feared unconventional religious requirements would be

discriminated against precisely because they were Jess "familiar to the
e 01) s e r \. e r . ,, 27 1
a \1 P._r a~~'

He d Issen
.
t eCI,
1
t_h oug,
h b ecause h e d 1. d no t_ 1)e I'
.leve +;,: h e

267 Id . at 528-33 ("Sapoleon may have been correct to assert that, in the
military sphere, morale is to all other factors as three is to one, but
contradicted assertions of necessity by the military do not on the scales of
justices bear a similarly disproportionate weight to sincere religious heJiefs
of the individual..") (citation omitted).
268 He mocked the reasoning which the Air Force supplied and Rehnquist
accepted: "Non-Jewish personnel will perceive the wearing of a yarmulke by an
Orthodox Jew as an unauthorized departure from the rules and will begin to
question the principle of unswerving obedience. Thus shall our fighting
forces slip down the treacherous slop toward unkempt appearance, anarchy, and,
ultimately, defeat at the hands of our enemies. The contention . . . surpass
es belief." Id. at 516-17.

269 Id . at 520.
270 Id . at 513 ("[T]he difference between a turban or a dreadlock, on the
one hand, and a yarmulke on the other, is not merely a difference in 'appear
ance'--it is also the difference between and Sikh or a Rastafarian, on the one
hand, and an Orthodox Jew on the other.").
271 Id . at 527.
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prohlems would result.

mental po] icies ",ere inherently til ted to favor mEl.instream reI ig

ns.

HE:

trnngly pressed this position:
The vLsihLlity test permits onl.v incHviduals ,,,hose outer garments
and groooling are indistinguishable from those of mainstrpam
Christians to fulfiL! their religious duties.

In

my vic~,',

thp.

Constitution requires the select jon of criteria that permjt the
greatest possible number of persons to practice their faiths
')~')

f r E' e 1\- . - / 
~\' i

t: h t his s tat e me nt, Br e n nan s t r 11 C kat the cor C

0
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ment concerning considerations of judicial difficulties in ctefjning religions
and

fcrretin.\~

out false claims.

Some judges and 1

scholars~

ludeci, sour,ht to eliminate all free eXt'rcise exemptions in

court's couLd not ensure that
fil~rlY

accommodated.

(~very

Stevens

~)art

because the

conceivable reI igious objector Houlct he

Brennan, while no doubt cognizant of the limits of

judicial pOlver, supported exemptions, even if the most obscure faiths might

not receive a fair hearing, because he sought to maximize opportunities for

religious exercises.

And given the structural favoritism for mainstream

religion anyway. Brennan saw no merit in a position which called for no
exemptions in the name of neutrality:
What puzzles me is the implication that a neutral standard that
could result in the disparate treatment of Orthodox Jews and, for
272 [d. at 521-22

~
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omp or unfair than the existing

neutral standard that dues result in the different treatnwnt of
Christians, on the one hand, and Orthodox Jews and Sikhs on the
other.

The practical effect of this

r

isibilitvj catcgc

zation is that, under the guise of neutrality and (;venha.ndelinf>'1S,
majority religions are favored over distinctive minority faithsJustice Stevens believes that this standard advances an
interest in the "uniform treatment" of all religions . . . .
[T]hat uniformity is illusory, unless uniformity means uniformly
accommodating majority reI

ious practices and uniformly rejecting

distinctive minority practices. . . .

A critical function of the

Religion Clause~ of the First Amendment is to protect the rights
of members of minority religions against quiet erosion by majori
tarian social institutions that dismiss minority beliefs and
practices as unimportant, because unfamiliar.,,273
Brennan in this cJpinion providerl the

learest ever Court statement of the

philosophical justifications for the pro-exemptions approach.

He even noted

that members of a minority faith were constitutionally entitled tu free
exercise exemptions when burdens on their practices are "the result of
insensitivity rather than design . .

,,274

But his words had not been

sufficient to sway the majority, not even Justice White.
In the 1970's, the Court had seemed to consider prisons and the military
somewhat similarly in that the Court should maintain a greater degree of

273 Id . at 521, 522. and 524.
274 Id. at 524.
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that past recognition, it should not be sut'prising that one \'ear arter Goldman
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applY strict scrutiny.
In this case, O'[one

L

Estate of Shabazz (19B7),276 a

by Rehnquist disagreed with a minority led bv Brennan about the proper
standard to apply to prison circumstances.

This case ":as not especially

significant to the development of strict scrutiny since neither Rehnquist nor
Brennan suggested that the Court applv it.

And the Court of C011rse had

already suggested in 1972 277 that a narrower free exercise standard should
be used in prison cases.

The dispute in this case really resembled a less

controversial version of Goldman, with Brennan arguing that the Court should
apply more than the hare minimum standard adopted by the Rehnquist majori
278

The only real broader significance this case holds for the develop

ment of strict scrutiny is that Brennan emphasized the centrality of the
impaircrt religious practice to the prisoners' religion.

The Brennan wing

0

the Court later began to invoke a similar centrality standard in mainstream
free exercise cases at the next Term. 279

275Compare Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974) and G.illette \'. United States,
401 U.S. 437 (1971) with Cruz \'. Beta, !t05 1I.S. 319 (1972).
276 482 U.S. 342.

277 Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972).
278They debate actually centered on the proper interpretation of the
prison standard which the Court had adopted in a case from another field in
the same year. See Turner v. Safley, 107 S.Ct. 2254 (1987).

279 See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 t;.S. 660
( 1988) .
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The Court also heanl ,:-mclher

Tn Hobbie

\I'.

ll~lenrplo\'fnent

compensati n claim in 1()87.

Unemploy'ment Appeals Comm 'n, 280 another Se\'enth-Dav Adventi st

was denied benefits when she Has fired from her joh for refusing to "':orl.:: on
Saturday.

Hobbie differed from Sherhert" onl '\ in thH.t

converted to the Seventh-Day Ad\'(,,:rlt. ist fai th aftpr

hd.d

he re I Ldous ohjectnr
inning her

she, rather than the employer, ,,:as "'the agent of change. ",281

disqualification was onlY partial.
\~'as

"no

jnh,

Also the

The Court held, eight-to-one, that there

meaningful distinction among the situations of Sherhert, Thomas, and
')8 ?

Hobbie."-'"

Only Rehnquist dissented, adhering to his Thomas opinion.

Apart from its reaffirmance of Sherbert and Thomas, the Hobbie opinion
added one other development to the evolution of strict scrutiny.

Brennan, in

his opinion for the Court, mentioned Burger's contention in Roy that strict
scrutiny should not be applied to cases involving indirect burdens.

But

Br nnan asserted that "[f]ive Justices expressly rejected this argument in Ro."
[and] [wle reject the argument again today.
lfl

Ro), refused to

oin Brennan's opinion.

Powell, who had sided with Burger
He noted that Burger had rlistin

guishecl Sherbert and Thomas so that Brennan had no reason to even consider

much less reject Burger's test. 283
rjrlg

Stevens also filed a separate concur

opinion, once more pressing his position that the exemptions in Sherbert

and Thomas v"ere only necessary to maintain equal treatment. 284

280 480 U.S. 136.
281 107 S.Ct. 1046, 1055
282 Id . at 1049.

283Burger had stepped down in 1986, so he was not on the Court for the
Hobbie case.

284He had made the same argument in his Lee dissent and in his Roy
concurrence.
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'\nv seeming rein\'igoration of

misleading,

Burger ha.d not

stepped

in 1986.

dO'Y:n

rf~mained

~;tr1(>t

upport for

10n

scrutiny i

(in the Court to hear the

Reagan e] €\/ated Hehnquist

to replace

Justice Scalia to fill Rehnquist's associa.te justice '.;eat.

Hohbie ,,:as

Hohbie

('fISC.

He

him anc! appointed
\] tho

Scalia

.joined Brennan's majority· opinion i.n Hobbie, he soon pr-ovecl that he '",as nn

') 8
friend of strict scrutiny. -< ')

significant.

The replacement of Burger proved to be verv

Where Burger had tried to formulate a free

exer~ise

compromisE'

in Roy, the new Chief was not at all interested in preserving strict scrutiny.
The replacement of Burger's more moderate voice with Rehnquist's and the
filling of Rehnquist's seat with an ideological mate shifted the Court further
from a pro-exemptions stance.

In addition, Powell's moderate vote was

replaced in 1988 by Justice Kennedy's, which in free exercise cases was
eventually cast with Rehnquist and Scalia. 286

As a result of these changes

in the Court's membership, the Brennan-O'Connor pro-exemptions wing of the
Court did not loose any members.

Marshall and Blackmun remained on the Court.

But the anti-exemptions wing became more categorically opposed to strict
sc'rutiny.

Burger and Powell had been the only justices seeking to moderate

free exercise doctrine while retaining strict scrutiny in a significant class
of cases.

After 1987, the pro-compromise moderates were gone.

the Court was sharply divided:

By 1988, then,

four justices favored strict scrutiny, four

opposed it, and White held the balance of power.
In 1988, the Court scaled back strict scrutiny again by extending the
internal-affairs exception that it had created in Roy (1986).287

In Lyng

285 See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 110 S.Ct. 1595
(1990)
286 Id .

287 476 U.S. 693 (1986)
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\1ativ(: American group challenged the C.S. Forest ()(-:rv'ce's decision to build a
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through an area of a national forest.
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Americi':lnS as the "high country," was rentral tn their rel igiolls pra:'t l P':"
Coo s t rue t Lon

0

f the r 0 ad t h r 0 ug h t h(-:

II

h i g h co u n t r v"

that it would seriously frustrate the tribes' abil
specific reI

ion.

'~'J 0

:.11 d

':>0

f

1 ! <.) r 11 r t t h (' a r 0 a

to practice their rite-

The Court heJd that government use of public lands was an

internal affair which objectors could not challenge on free exercise grounds.
Justice O'Connor wrote the opinion for a five-to-three majority.

She

and White broke from the Brennan camp in this case, and Kennedy did not
participate.

She believed that her opinion was a straightforward extension of

the logic of Ro.-v.

She noted that in neither Roy nor Northwest Indian '\lOuld

the affected individuals be coerced by the Government's action into violating
their religious beliefs; nor would either governmental action penalize
religious activity by denying any person an equal share of the rights,
' 'I eges enJoye
.
d bY ot h er CItIzens
..
,,?89
l)ene f" Its, aneIprIvl
....

1

The majority

placed heavy weight on the fact that government was not furcing a choice on
the Native Americans, as it had done in Sherbert and the other free exercise
precedents.

They were not being coerced into violating any tenets of faith.

Sherbert had to choose between her Saturday abstinence and unemployment
benefits.

The government policy in Northwest Indian did not present the

objectors with such a choice.

The government was simply building a road on

its land.
The majority was also influenced by two other factors.

First, the

challengers asked the Court to distinguish Roy on the ground that the burden
288 108 S.Ct. 1319
289 Id. at 1325
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religious exercise in
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Vorthr"(H,t Tnd.ian '\.·~as

much
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~reater

than the hurrlen \,:;.:..:;

But O'Connor noted that the Court could not delve into the truth or

falsity of religious beliefs.
religion field prevented
hall e.nge.rs and

r1et~rmini

th(~

ng

Inherent: limits to .iadicial powC'r in the
Court from

,9,

ttin:y. inside the reI

\·;hether the injurY in nne case

severe than the injury in another.

i·,OU]

d

~nns

of

he

morf~

Second, the majority was constrained

the possibility of future claims, more demanding than the one in this case.
O'Connor noted that the Native Americans might decide that they could not
practice their reI

ion if outsiders were permitted in the area.

She

~as

not

willing to set a precedent which might have led eventually to granting tribes
"de facto

beneficial ownership of some rather spacious tracts of public

property.,,290

She further noted that even granting the claim in this case

would significantly impair governmental property rights by forbidding the
construction of a road any-where in a 17,000 acre area.

The Court could not

grant such a religious veto over land-use decisions of the U.S. Forest
Service.
Brennan, joined by Marshall and Blackmun, dissented.
Court should apply strict scrutiny in this case.

He

He argued 1'hat the

disputed O'Connor's

assertion that unless government coerced or penalized an individual's exercise
of religion the free exercise clause was not violated.

He argued that anytime

government hampered an individual's ability to exercise his religion, it
violated free exercise.

However, O'Connor rightly pointed out that Brennan

had torn a quote from Yoder out of context to support his position.

He

claimed that the Court's decision in that case was based on the potential that
secondary education for Amish children threatened the continued existence of
the Amish faith.

In fact, the Court placed much more emphasis on the coercive

290 Id. at 1327.
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natL:re nf the compulsory

l,~dUCd.t

ion!

parents to violate a tenet of faith.
Jlldian
(1.0

1n

Yor!Pl".

It cnmpell('d the Amish

Trw 2.()v(:rr:.mental po] ic'\- in ,Vorthr,,'f'st

did not coerce thE' Nati\(-'\mer1cans, eithE'r directl,,; or indirectly. to

anvthir:s.
f',rennaTl also

vere

II

argued that the Court could determine h'hich pubLic lan(t

l'
b 1 e \I?- 91 t 0 certaIn
.
centra.1 " or ".InClspensa.

~atlve

l\i'

•
l' .
AmerIcan
relglons

and apply strict scrutiny only to interferences with those areas.

Again,

O'Connor warned against judging the truth or falsity of religious beliefs.
She

sllggested that if the Court adopted Brennan's position, it might find

itself in disagreement with religious adherents and end up ruling that they
"misunderstand their own religious beliefs.,,292
However, Brennan did present a legitimate argument regarding Roy.

It

could be distinguished, he believed, because the activity in that case was
completely internal while the activi ty in Northwest Indian 'vas external.
ohviouslv the activities in the two cases were of different natures.
did not adequately refute this contention.

And

O'Connor

She suggested that the use of the

social security number in Roy could not be considered any more internal than
the activity in this case.

The effect in Roy was to drain the spirit of Hov's

daughter; that effect, O'Connor suggested, could not be considered internal.
However, the Court had noted in Roy that in judging constitutional claims "the
Constitution, rather than an individual's religion, must supplY the frame of
reference.,,293

To argue that the activity in Roy was as external as that

in Northwest Indian, O'Connor had to do exactly what she had stridently
opposed doing--get inside the religion of the challenger to evaluate the
291 Id. at 1338.
292 Id . at 1330.

293 Roy, 476 U.S. at 701, n. 6.
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1.n a governmental computer S'lstem is cLear! \'
~'uad

mon~

1 O!~

i.nternal t'han huilding

il

through a national forest, (?ven if the rO;·.d is l",-hollv Hithin the bound

aries of public proper

The Court could have drah'n a distinc,tion. hut it

!TIay not have heen enough to change the olltCr)me.

This case might have presented a perfect situation for a modified fr e
exercise doctrine.

O'Connor noted that the Forest Service had evaluated

several proposed routes for the road and had chosen the one which it believerl
interfered Hith the religiolls practices of Native Americans the least.
fact of the case might have suggested a compromise.

This

In cases like Northtv'est

Indian and, perhaps, even Roy, where a governmental activity will have a
negative impact on religious practices but does not coerce anyone into
violating their tenets of faith, the Court might require government to use the
least restrictive means available without substantiallv undermining its
interests or increasing its costs.

But the Court might not require government

to demonstrate that its interest was compelling.

It is questionable whether

or no t the gave rnmentaJ interest in constructing the road
could have been considered compelling.

j n

:Vorthr.ies t Indian

But if the Forest Service had not

chosen to try to accommodate the Native Americans religious practices as best
it could, it should have been required to do so bv the free exercise clause.
In another Native American case decided at the same time as Northwest

Indian, the Court cut back free exercise strict scrutiny in yet another way.
In Employment Div.

t

Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith (1988) (Smith 1)294 the

Court first reviewed the case involving sacramental use of peyote.

It will be

recalled that two Native American's were fired from their jobs with a private
drug rehabilitation center when the center learned of their religious use of

294 108 S.Ct. 1444

~
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,{ I

deemed their sacramental dru;-~ us

tu 1)(~ "m:';(' ~l(hH't:1f

hithin the

frH';lrling

f

The (;ourt sp it i.n the S(.lme manner that it had in Vnrthr.;est fnrlian.

O'Connor iind Hhite Joined Rehnquist, Stevens, and Scalia in the majority, and
Brennan.

~arshall,

and Blackmun dissented.

HavIng not taken his seat until

after oral argument, Kennedy, again. did not participate.

Also, again, the

majority did not apply strict scrutiny, while Brennan, in dissent. argued that
it should have.

Stevens,

~ho

wrote the majority opinion, asserted that Sherbert, Thomas.

and Hobbie did not control the case, because the conduct engaged in by the
religious objectors in those cases had not been illegal.

The majority simplY

held that if Oregon exempted the religious possession or use of peyote from
its general drug laws, then the Native Americans' conduct
may ~;ell be

entitled to constitutional protection.

On

the other

hand, if Oregon does prohibit the religious use of pevote, and if
that prohibition is consistent with the Federal Constitution,
there is no federal right to engage in that conduct in Oregon.

If

that is the case, the State is free to withhold unemployment
compensation. .

295

So the majority ruled that if a state has validly prohibited some form of
conduct, then religious objectors who are fired for participating in that
conduct can be disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits, even if
their participation was required by their religion.
295 Id . at 1451.

But the prohibition
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Ctiurt was not certain if Ore'?;t)t1 pro\,: idee! all
lj''';{C."

10h

;~xempt:ion

for sacramental peyote

it remaIlded the case to the state supreme court for a decision on this

issue.
Br e nnan

\1.,'

r {) t e the dis sen tingop i nion,

d

r g 11 i n,0;

simply applied strict scrutiny and decided the case.

t hat

the c: n u r t s h C) 1l ! d h a'.' e

He explained that law

enforcement was not the purpose of Oregon's unemployment compensation law, so
preventing illegal activity could not be considered a compelling interest.
Protecting the unemployment fund from fraudulent claims was the onlv conceiv
able governmental interest justifying the disqualification, and Sherbert,
Thomas, and Hobbie forced the Court to conclude that protecting the fund was
not a compelling interest.

But the majority opted, instead, to foreclose the

potential for strict scrutiny analysis in another class of free exercise
claIms.
One year after Sm.i th I, the Court decided yet another unemployment
compensation claim.

In this case, Frazee v. TJlinoi5 Dep't of EmpJovment Sec.

(1989),296 a unanimous Court held that Illinois could not disqualifv an
individual from receiving benefits because his religious objections were not
grounded in the tenets of an organized sect.

The claimant declined to take a

job which was offered him because it woulrl have required him to work on

Sunday.

Because he called himself merely a Christian but did not rlaim any

denominational affiliation, he was denied benefits.

The Court simplY heJd

that affiliation with an organized religion was not necessary for one's
beliefs to qualify for free exercise protection.
So in the last free exercise case of the 1980's, the Court unanimously
extended previous free exercise rulings.
296 109 S.Ct. 1514.
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As the Court entered the 1990's, it rf'mained deeply clividerl.

exercise strict srrutinv.

Brennan, Marshall,
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r

ft'('f h

p0siti,on

Stev~ns,

Rehnquist,

t?

Blackmun still strongly

;lOcI

backed the doctrine, and O'Connor returned to thi
foray into the Rehnquist camp.

fr

O\'E':

Scalia, and Kenne(iv ais

formed a powerful bloc in opposition to strict scrutiny.

But

\':hit{~.

the

perennial free exercise vacillator, finally appeared to decide against strict
s rutiny in 1990.

He firmly joined with the

Rf~hnqllist

bloc to "irt:lall,
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Since several

I
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98 and apparently en

countered no significant problems with the policy, the Court might have
applied strict scrutiny and held that the free exercise clause required an

297Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 110 S.Ct. 1595
298 See Smith II, 110 S.Ct. at 1606 (citing statutes).
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But the majority did not opt for any of these approaches to this

Instead, over t.he

[':;tSC.

tgorous dissents of O'Connor and Blackmun, SC3.li<1.

deleted strict scrutiny from free exercise jurisprudence and ne;ltly 0rased it
from hi.stnrv.

He establi.shed a standard of review which had absclutelv no

basis whatsoever in free exercise precedents.
generally applicahle, secular
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~,;ould
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not grant

religious e>;:empti.ons i.n ;), Deral.

range of cases.

In reaching h:s result,

Scalia misrepresented or misapplied more than a half-dozen free

f'xerci~p

prEcedE'nt~.

299 This method of basing a free exercise conclusion in part on the
experiences of states with statutory exemptions has been applied before.
e.g, Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407, n. 7 (1963).

See,

300 0 'Connor took this course in her opinion concurring in the result.
ld. at 1613-15

301 374 U.S. at 403 ("[T]he Court has rejected challenges under the Free
Exercise Clause to governmental regulation of certain overt acts prompted by
religious principles. . . . The conduct or actions so regulated have invari
ably posed some substantial threat to public safety, peace or order.")
302 1595 U.S. at 1599.

:i

The Dpmise of Free EXf.~rcise Strict Scrutiny.

S.

1" t

J
l l 'lng th
I
'! ."'~.,
~."·l·',!I'·'·L"~[\. c;,tr'~{}'., icaJ.
. em "h V11I"
Ie
,

s

~ 1 1d

1.

r c () mp u 1 so r v e d 11 cat ion 1a\.: 'b; 1 t ; rn

T) (: ..:,

(>

d

r

prf"s

Lng itc'ill u

!l(Jth the free

'h

He i.lss(~rted that Yoder had been based on
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e\E'rctse clduse and the parental rlght to priv'lcy. .As a result:.

it ,las not d pure free exercise case but y;as a "hybrid.

I,

Yoder had heen based

In part on parental privacy, but the opinion was clearly divided into two

segments.

One applied strict scrutiny to deal with the free exercise chal

lenge to the compulsory law itself.

After the Court found that no compelling

reason existed for denying an exemption, it had to deal with the

~t

te's

additional claim that since the case involved children! parcns patriae
the state to assert pow'pr over the Amish children.
paI P ntal right. to prjvacy to (Espose of that

f3Ct. since

cJaim,
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hildren here not involved in Smith II, the parental pri\'ac""

section of Yoder was

controlled.

std.t;~

The Court cLC'].rl <:
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irrelevant~

a.nd its free exercise portion should have

It required the Court to apply strict scrutiny to the drug

la~.

Scalia also dismissed CantweJ1 304 and Murdock,305 both of i-Jhich
endorsed the least-restrictive-means standard, as "hybrids."
also had combined two distinct challenges.

But Cantwell

A statute providing for adminis

trative censorship of religion was struck down on free exercise grounds.
303 Id. at 1602.
304Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)
305Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943)
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tl \- pointed out that the Court had only "purported" to appl v the

cloc rine in Gillette and Lee.

But he went heyond this point, suggesting th:'.17

,)ut side t'he unemployment compensation field the Court had either only "pur
ported" to apply the doctrine or had not applied it at all.
precedents to support this proposition.

He miSrE':lrescnted

He presented RO'yand Northr·/e"t Tnrfian

as though they were typical free exercise cases, merely commenting that
declined to apply Sherbert's analysis,,307 in them.

He even had the gall to

impl y that 0' Connor was obviousl y mistaken in claiming that Rosr and Northwest

306prince v. i\fassachusetts, 121 U.S. 158,164 (1944)

307 110 S.Ct. at 1602.
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1,.-:here indirect burdens were discriminatory.
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The Court applied strjet

in unemployment compensation cases because the state's refusal to
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practic~s,

even though it had established a
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of

individualized review, suggested a discriminatory intent on the part of the
states.

Burger set aside cases where general laws burdened free exercise

indirectly for evaluation under a standard less rigorous than strict scrutiny.

Scalia adapted this view, suggesting that strict scrutiny "was developed in a

308 Id . at 1603, n. 2.

i

r:t

'\1

,',(l\'i'rnlllf'nt

<;;;p

f

I

had estahJ i.3hed

" ~ 1()

II

., t

The t rile pic t 11 r e \-; as {) n e

n Gr m .

it h na,rrcnvl y def:

Tj(~d

e~cept

1)

f

'3

,i ons for

~lot

'f
1"

be\' 0 n d the

il S

e . .~ ,."

t. h e r E' e

; ntcrna.l gov·crnmenL.'l af

~fte.r

1n t 0 ShE' r h..~ r t s () Im~

t s c rut in"

tr

d

rs

,:;

compen sat i 0 Tl fie ) d,

;:,pply it to require exemptions fr()m a generally ;ipplicab

E'

"

1 S r~

r ;]

'1 f)

,'l.Ed

he related his distrnte! \'i

11 n e mpI 0\Tn e n t

The

1)1:

",7

e \,- 0 u1 d

criminal 1a';.-7.

h-e conclude todd~' that the sounder approach, and the approach in accord

ith the \C1St majority of Ollr precedents, is to hold the test inapplicable to
S

'.](·'.h·
_.

('1.,.;)1.lc'rl"'~I'.S.,.,,·\11
! ~L.~
J

ThE' Court had he td in Sml. til [ that i. f Oregon ' 5 cr :n1

r:;d ba.n on pevote use was const'itutional

t

so was its denia.l of unemployment

!H':'nefits to the Native American challengers in the Smith case.
the new

"':el1~

:lpp1 Lng
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noted that
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courting anarchy, but that danger increases in direct proportion

309[d. at 1603.
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~oreover,

he sought to avoid a doctrine that would require thp

Court t.o constant Lv {j,nal VIe legislation for compell ing interests i.n the face
of free

exerci~e

challenges.

for memllers of reI

He concluded his opinion with little sympathy

iOlls minorities:

It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the polit:cal
process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious
practices that are not widely engaged in; but that unavoirlabJe
consequenre of democratic government must be vreferred to a system
in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges
weigh the social importance of all laHs against the

nt: red i ty of

a I ~, re 1'"
19lOUS" b e l'
.le f s. 313

Al though Scal·j a fashioned a str iet-neutral i ty test in Smi th [1,

~1e

real Lzed

that strict neutrality actuallY meant structural discrimination against
minority sects.

It simply was not an important enough consideration to

involve the courts in its resoJution.
scrutiny.

------_._-.--------
312 Id . at 1605.
313 Id . at 1606.

And on that note, he abolished strict

1

i,

CONCLUDING

RR~ARKS.

In an opinion founded on misrepresentation, the Court killed free
exercise strict scrutiny in one stroke.
clause, as well.
own.

With it really went the free exercise

Strict scrutiny had given the clause a unique scope of its

It had been important as a balancing force against the structural

discrimination of majority rule, which even Scalia tacitly acknowledged to be
real.

Without the doctrine, the clause itself was reduced to a protection

against religious discrimination, a spare equal protection clause.

The free

exercise clause no longer had any independent meaning.
There were obviously problems with strict scrutiny.
exemptions might conflict with the establishment clause.

Its mandated
But it seems

th~t

any resolution of that conflict should have come at the expense of the
establishment clause.

To resolve the conflict by altering free exercise

doctrine required the radical surgery Scalia administered in Smith II.

\fo

free exercise policy short of the elimination of exemptions would have
definitively brought it into line with the commands of establishment clause
doctrine.

But only slight modification of the interpretation of that clause

would have permitted the fullest construction of free exercise.

The problem

with clause conflict, it seems, is how to distinguish between acceptable forms
of accommodation of religion from unacceptable forms establishment clause
doctrine that in the abstract recoqnizes none.

Concluding Remarks.

116

,-\ second funclamenta,l probll'm \,ith iT'

(.

rei (' ': ; t ric t

'::>

C

rut i \"

~~ n t '~

(1

a r 0 11 n cl the in her e n t 1 i In ita t ion son t: he Cu u r t 's a i l i tv t [) e val U;l t ere 1 L~ 1. 0 U s
LIII S •

Par t

rec()5~nizing

As

!',renni'{n

0

f

the pro b 1 f~ m i s t h ;:..l t i t has d iff leu 1 t ,\/ de· fin i ng reI

ffirlr-gina.l sects.
poi :lIJ~d out

But this problem seems to he a h

in Goldman.

favor the Christ an mainstream.
democracy.
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That results from the structural hias of

And he asked of Stevens, how one discriminatory rule was fairer

than another.

People

~ho

argue that the Cuurt should not g ant any exemptions

because its cannot be ahsolutely certain it ""'ill never overlook one sect are
following Stevens' reasoning.

They fail to r

policy also results in discrimination.

ze that a no-exemptions

Recognizing judicial limiL:ttions and

the possibilities of discrimination under both approaches, Brennan sought to
maximize religious libert\r.

Under such a theory the Court should not be

deterred from granting free exercise exemptions because it might overlooK In
olJscurf' faith.

It should accommodate every belief it can genuinely

as

This approach might result in a small amount of judicial

J~giti~ate.

rf>(~ogtliLf:

,li':icriminatjr-m, hut a no-exemptions polic v would subject every clearlv

legitimate yet non-mainstream faith to the structural discrimination of
d(~m()('racy

simpl

n~c().'5nizable.

because a few fringe religions might not be judicially
That position does not seem rational.

Another part of the problem is that the Court cannot always ferret out
fraudulent religious claims.
claims are clearly legitimate.

But there are ways around this difficulty.

~any

In almost every free exercise case reaching

the Supreme Court, the government had not challenged the religious objectors
sincerity of belief.

Other claims are fairly easy to reject as motivated by

Conc:uding RemarKs.
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i.ndeterminate zone in the middle.
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t.he Court CGuid establ ish a pol i

to avoid in depth examination of those claims.
any claim which it cannot

t

It c()ulcl opt

to~imp1

:lC

ept:
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it

ness of the exami.nation of sincerity, to \-:hjen (.;ome justices, most

nctahl\~

Stevens, have objected. 315
But these consi.derations did not seem to be driving the erosion of
strict scrutiny in the 1980's.

1n5tea..:. changes in the poJ itical cJ imate. the

ideological agendas of some justices, and changes in Court membership more
adequatel v account for the eventual demise of the doctrine.

And the anfortu

nate result may be not only structural bias in the democratic proces
intentional sllppression.

The strict scrutiny doctrine and

relig~ous

tions evolved gradually as the Court gained experience in the
field.
~nce

fr~e

but
exemp

exer isc

The suppression of Jehovah's VJitnesses in the 1940's Has one experi

thilt probably shaped the outlooks of at least three justices.

They

ultimately decided that the Gobitis 316 decision, implicitly sanctioning
such discrimination, had been wrongly decided. 317

31~See, e.g., Da'vis v. Page, 385 F.Supp. 395 (197 /+) (rejecting parents
challenge to school curriculum requirements when parent's initial written
objection was based primarily on consideration of personal or political
preferences)

315 1n fact, in United States v. Ballard. 322 U.S. 78, 92-95 (1944)
(holding courts could not determine truth or falsity of religious beliefs,
only the sincerity with which they are held) (Jackson, J., dissenting),
Justice Jackson argued that courts should not even investigate sincerity, but
should accept religious claims at face value.
316 310 U.S. 586 (1940)
317 See Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 611-12 (1942) (Black, J.,
dissenting)
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The new doctrine Scaiia fdShionf':.t in Smith

i [ ~ad

no

history, so its potential impact on society is not cleiir.
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